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We use instrumental variables for teenage employment opportunities to identify the causal eﬀects of part-time 
work during compulsory education in England on educational performance at age 16 and labour market outcomes 
to age 25. We identify the total ‘policy eﬀect’, partly driven by resulting changes in other inputs, and the direct 
eﬀect or ‘production function parameter’, which holds these constant. The total eﬀects of an additional hour of 
part-time work per week at age 15 include reducing educational performance in school-leaving qualiﬁcations by 
males by 2.5% and females by 6.7% of a standard deviation, and increasing duration of unemployment experience 
before age 25 by two months. Direct eﬀects on long-run outcomes are generally beneﬁcial for women and less so 
for men. What human capital or signalling beneﬁts there are to teenage part-time work are substantially oﬀset 
by the eﬀects of reduced educational investments. 
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0. Introduction 
Across developed economies, many children participate in part-time
mployment alongside compulsory schooling. OECD ﬁgures from 2015
how 30% of 15 year-olds in the United States taking paid work, 23%
n the United Kingdom, 18% in Germany and 14% in France. Declin-
ng participation in part-time work by teenagers in the UK has been
lamed by employers’ organizations for young adults being increasingly
ll-prepared for full-time employment, with negative implications for
orkforce productivity and economic growth ( UK Commission on Em-
loyment and Skills, 2015 ). Working while still in education may im-
rove teenagers’ stock of cognitive and non-cognitive human capital, in
he form of ﬁnancial literacy, communication skills, and lower discount
ates ( Light, 2001; Oettinger, 1999 ), but could also crowd out time al-
ocated to productive educational ‘investments’ ( Becker, 1965; Ruhm,
997 ). Since qualiﬁcations obtained from compulsory education help
etermine subsequent education opportunities, the eﬀect of in-school
mployment on test scores is likely to restrict or enhance trajectories
f human capital accumulation over a much longer period ( Dustmann☆ This work was carried out during PhD studies supported by an Economic and 
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ect wage return to obtaining more age-16 academic qualiﬁcations, and
t higher grades, even holding constant qualiﬁcations obtained later
 Dearden et al., 2002; McIntosh, 2006 ). 
In this paper we evaluate the eﬀect of part-time work during school
erm-time at age 15 on educational performance at age 16 and retention
n full-time education, unemployment experience, earnings, and occu-
ational attainment up to age 25. Our contribution is to identify both
he ‘policy eﬀect’ eﬀect of part-time work, and its parameter in the ‘pro-
uction function’ for educational or labour market performance. The
policy eﬀect’ includes indirect eﬀects of resulting changes to other in-
uts, while the ‘production function parameter’ is the direct eﬀect hold-
ng these other inputs constant. This distinction, and the mechanisms
nderlying it, matter for policy implications in education. For example,
e Fraja et al., (2010) and Datar and Mason (2008) show that students
nd parents substitute school inputs for their own, meaning that policy
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t  entions’ beneﬁts in the education production function. In our applica-
ion, it is important to know both whether part-time work as a teenager
osters accumulation or eﬀective signalling of human capital, and the ex-
ent to which any such beneﬁts are reduced or outweighed by crowding
ut of educational investments. 
We use data from “Next Steps ”, a longitudinal survey tracking a co-
ort born in 1989–90 and attending school in England in 2004, up to age
5 in 2015. Following Tyler (2003) , Rothstein, (2007) and Kalenkoski
nd Pabilonia (2010) ’s studies on part-time work and the educational
erformance of US High School students, we obtain identiﬁcation by
sing time-varying indicators of local labour market opportunities for
eenagers as instrumental variables for in-school employment, namely
he youth unemployment rate and density of small businesses in the re-
ail, wholesale, hotel and restaurant sectors. In our range of outcome
ariables, we follow Ruhm (1997) , who adopts a similar IV approach
nd ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of teenage part-time work on total and hourly
arnings and occupational attainment between 6 and 9 years after High
chool graduation despite a negative eﬀect on completed education; and
otz et al. (2002) who show the long-run positive eﬀects on wages to
e small and statistically insigniﬁcant once they account for individuals’
ntire history of work experience. 
We are guided by and contribute to two further related litera-
ures. The ﬁrst is on the relationships between part-time work, ed-
cational performance, and teenagers’ allocation of time, attitude to
choolwork, and consumption patterns. Sabia (2009) ﬁnds few im-
ortant eﬀects of part-time work on schooling-related attitudes and
nvestments among 12–15 year-olds, while Kalenkoski and Pabilonia
2009, 2012) ﬁnd an additional hour of employment reduces home-
ork time by 11min, with signiﬁcant crowd-out also of screen time,
port, and other extra-curricular activities. Meanwhile, part-time work
ay facilitate contemporaneous consumption of risky substances (al-
ohol, cigarettes and cannabis) through the child’s budget constraint
 Markowitz and Tauras, 2006 ) or exposure to diﬀerent peers ( Clark
nd Lohéac, 2007 ) either in the working environment or by provid-
ng more opportunities freely to associate without parental supervision
 Lee, 2013 ). The next piece of the puzzle is whether these changes in
ehaviour have independent eﬀects on performance. Kalenkoski and
abilonia (2017) show that marginal homework time has positive ef-
ects on academic achievement only for boys, who devote less time to
omework on average, while Rees and Sabia (2010) yield no strong
vidence that sporting participation enhances academic performances
f adolescents of either sex. Alcohol, cigarette and drug consumption
ave all been shown to reduce educational performance and retention
 Bray et al., 2000; Yan and Brocksen, 2013 ), with only Dee and Evans
2003) ﬁnding no direct eﬀects of alcohol consumption. 
The second literature is on the bias in estimates of returns to ed-
cation caused by part-time work experience. Light (2001) shows the
eturns to an additional year of schooling in the original NLSY (1979)
ohort are at least 25% higher when in-school work experience is omit-
ed. The direction of this eﬀect is robust to analysis on more recent co-
orts ( Ashworth et al. 2017 ). However Hotz et al. (2002) , show that the
eturn to “school plus work ” can be lower than “school only ”. This ac-
ords with the time allocation literature, suggesting that part-time work
an reduce the quality or quantity of engagement with education dur-
ng nominally “full-time schooling ”. Analogously to Light (2001) , our
esearch questions can be stated: “How does the causal eﬀect of part-
ime work change when the education enhancing role of study time is
etted out? ” and “How does the causal eﬀect of part-time work change
hen the wage enhancing role of school performance is netted out? ”. 
We analyse how the magnitude of each of these eﬀects diﬀer by sex,
n contrast to the prior literature on part-time work during schooling
hich has focused intentionally on males ( Hotz et al., 2002; Light, 2001;
olitor and Leigh, 2005 ), or considered gender diﬀerences only as a ro-
ustness check ( Tyler, 2003 , who ﬁnds no diﬀerences) or a control vari-
ble ( Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010 ). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
otal or ‘policy eﬀect’ of age-15 part-time work on age 16 educationalerformance that is somewhat larger (eﬀect size of 6.7% of a standard
eviation per hour worked per week) for females than males (2.5%).
e also show that part-time work crowds out study time, attitude to
choolwork, and ‘active leisure’ (sporting and music) activities, and fa-
ilitates consumption of risky substances. Holding these constant, the
roduction function parameter is negative but smaller and statistically
nsigniﬁcant. We ﬁnd detrimental or zero total eﬀects of age-15 part-
ime work on labour market performance by age 25, including dura-
ion of unemployment for both sexes, and occupational attainment for
omen. These results appears substantially to be driven by reduced ed-
cational performance at age 16. The direct eﬀect of part-time work at
ge 15 on these outcomes is somewhat beneﬁcial. 
. Institutional background 
.1. Employment of children in England 
Children in England are allowed to take paid part-time work from
ge 13 ( Department for Children, Schools and Families - DCSF, 2009 ).
here is no national minimum wage for children aged 16 or below. Next
teps data shows 22% of 14 year-olds and 28% of 15 year-olds in part-
ime work. These ﬁgures are lower than in the most comparable data
or the United States, namely the National Longitudinal Study of Youth
997 (NLSY97), in which 41% of male and 34% of female 10th graders
15–16 year-olds) were observed in part-time work in 2000 and 2004
 Rothstein, 2007 ). 
A Department for Education review into the regulation of child work-
rs ( McKechnie et al., 2011 ) shows those below the school leaving age to
e concentrated in the catering (23%), retail (16%) and delivery (39%)
ectors. Most employers of children are small businesses (40% employ
0 staﬀ or fewer, and 88% employ 50 or fewer) who recruit informally
y responding to unsolicited approaches (56%) and/or obtain employ-
es through word of mouth (40%). There are age-speciﬁc legal restric-
ions on hours and tasks. Those under 16 cannot work ‘mainly or solely’
or the sale of alcohol, for example, while those in compulsory education
ay work only 12 h per week in term-time, including a maximum of 2 h
n a weekday or Sunday; 8 h on a Saturday (5 h if under 15 years); one
our before school on a weekday; and none during school hours or after
pm on a school night ( Department for Children, Schools and Families -
CSF, 2009 ). While we are unable to ascertain whether the daily limits
r the types of work permitted are adhered to, in the Next Steps data
e observe 97% and 95% of those in part-time work at ages 14 and
5 working 12 h per week or less, suggesting that self-regulation keeps
hem to within sensible levels. The informality of this labour market is
nderlined by how few employers obtain the permit from the Local Ed-
cation Authority required to enable them to employ children legally:
4–15% of child workers are correctly covered ( Howieson et al., 2006;
cKechnie et al., 2005 ). See Appendix A.1 for further explanation of
he regulation of child employment in England. 
Sectoral diﬀerences may help explain sex diﬀerences in the eﬀects
f part-time work. Delivery work is most prevalent among the youngest
hild employees, and among males (43%, versus 11% of females -
owieson et al., 2012 ), and is more likely to be broken down into short,
redictable, daily or weekly shifts than retail or catering work. It may
hen be less disruptive to schoolwork. However, retail and catering jobs
re more likely to promote communication, interpersonal skills, self-
onﬁdence, and numeracy ( McKechnie et al., 2010 ), through tasks re-
uiring co-operation with others, dealing directly with customers, or
upervising and training other employees (81%, 76% and 22% of child
orkers in the retail sector do these tasks; Howieson et al., 2012 ). 
.2. Measuring educational performance 
Our measure of academic performance at age 16 is a standardized
ransformation of the ‘GCSE and equivalent total point score’. For each
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d  tudent this is derived from grades in academic GCSE (General Certiﬁ-
ate of Secondary Education) and equivalent level vocational qualiﬁ-
ations in around 10 subjects, of which GCSEs in English, Maths and
cience are compulsory. These courses are taken over the two academic
ears (running September-July) during which they turned age 15 and
6. Approximately 80% of the marks contributing to GCSE grades are
erived from ﬁnal exams taken at the end of this second year, which for
ur cohort marked the end of compulsory schooling. 1 The remainder,
nd almost all marks in vocational qualiﬁcations, come from coursework
nd mid-term tests. A higher ﬁnal grade in each subject contributes more
oints to a student’s total score. 
All these qualiﬁcations are criterion-based, measuring performance
gainst a ﬁxed standard rather than relative to peers. A “good pass ”
grade C, on an A ∗ to G scale) in both English and Maths is a formal re-
uirement for public-sector occupations such as social work or teaching,
egardless of any higher qualiﬁcations obtained ( Machin et al., 2018 ).
oreover, GCSEs are the only completed qualiﬁcations that 17–18 year-
ld prospective undergraduates hold when they apply to university,
aking the overall proﬁle of GCSE results a key determinant of sub-
equent opportunities. We report results based on a z -score obtained
y subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard devia-
ion. Henceforth we refer to this as the “GCSE z -score ”. To account for
ach student’s predetermined academic outcomes, we also control for
he total point score in low-stakes ‘National Tests’ in English, Maths and
cience at age 11 and age 14. 
. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from the Secure Access version of “Next Steps ”
 University College London et al., 2018 ), formerly issued as the “Lon-
itudinal Study of Young People in England ” (LSYPE). This is linked to
ata on performance in school exams in the National Pupil Database
NPD), and to detailed geographical identiﬁers. This sample is drawn
rom a single academic cohort of teenagers in England who are inter-
iewed at age 14 in 2004, annually until 2010, then again in 2015. 
.1. Employment and other activities during compulsory schooling 
Table 1 shows estimates of participation rates, hours and earnings
rom part-time work, and demographic characteristics, educational out-
omes, and other activity levels by employment status, for the popu-
ation of 14 and 15 year-old males and females at school in England in
004 and 2005. The unweighted sample sizes are presented in the table,
ut all statistics are based on probability-weighted observations. 
Term time employment is captured by the questions “Do you ever do
ny work in a spare-time paid job, even if it is only for an hour or two
ow and then? (Please don’t include jobs you only do during the school
olidays or voluntary work) ”, and for those answering ‘yes’, “How many
ours on average do you usually work in this job (or jobs) during a term
ime week? Please include any hours you work at the weekend during
erm-time ”. At age 14 (15), 25% (29%) of boys and 19% (27%) of girls
ave a part-time job in term-time. The large initial gap is consistent
ith males and females being active in distinct labour markets with
iﬀerent demand-side factors and human capital implications ( Erdogan.
t al., 2012; Kooreman, 2009 ). This makes it important to estimate our
odels separately by sex. Those in employment are positively selected
n age 11 educational performance, and go on to have higher GCSE
cores. Age-15 workers outperform age-15 non-workers by 14% (males)
r 20% (females) of a standard deviation. Females outperform males on
verage by 27% of a standard deviation. 
We measure ﬁve additional inputs to the production function for ed-
cational and labour market performance: Attitude to schoolwork, study1 It is now compulsory to remain in full-time education or training until one’s 
8th birthday. 
o  
2ﬀort, active leisure, social life, and risky behaviours. All are measured
s a z -score (standard deviations from the pooled sample mean) of the
rincipal component of an ordered logit measurement model derived
rom questions on time use and frequency of participation in key activ-
ties. These are described in full in Tables 2 and 3 . Table 1 shows that
hose in work on average have very similar attitudes to and undertake
ery similar levels of schoolwork to those not employed. However, those
n work engage more frequently in active leisure (participation in mu-
ic and sport), social activities (frequency of going out with friends, or
ttendance at entertainment venues), and risky behaviours (cigarette,
lcohol and cannabis consumption), with diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the
% level in all cases. We evaluate the causal eﬀect of part-time work on
hese activities, and the diﬀerence that accounting for these makes in
he production function, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
Figs. 1 and 2 plot the proportion of 14 and 15 year old males
nd females in part-time work by, respectively, parental income decile
nd parental subjective household ﬁnancial situation, with 95% conﬁ-
ence intervals. Both show that in general children with higher earn-
ng or more ﬁnancially comfortable parents are more likely to be in
art-time work. While there may be signiﬁcant levels of involuntary
on-participation (due to a lack of opportunities) in the lowest income
eciles or the 7.6% of households in ﬁnancial diﬃculties, these ﬁg-
res suggest very few of the children taking part-time work are do-
ng so because it is necessary to contribute to household ﬁnances.
ppendix A.2 shows similar positive selection by parental occupation
nd education levels. 
Table 4 compares teenagers’ (and in one case, their parents’) educa-
ional and occupational aspirations by part-time work status. The upper
anel of Table 4 shows small deﬁcits in intention to remain in full-time
ducation or apply to university for those in part-time work relative
o those who are not. Nevertheless, most 14–15 year-olds in part-time
ork clearly intend to continue at school, which does not support invest-
ent in experience to improve immediate job prospects being a common
otivation. Taken together, these results suggest that immediate con-
umption is more likely to be motivation for part-time work than any
orward-looking investment in gaining independence and control after
he school-to-work transition (through becoming self-employed, having
 job that is interesting to them, or with regular hours) or raising future
onsumption (given the lower valuation of career progression possibili-
ies). 
.2. Long-run education and labour market outcomes 
We evaluate eﬀects on a further 15 variables representing education
r labour market outcomes up to 10 years after we measure part-time
ork. These include retention in full-time education or training at age
7; participation in college or university at age 19; the status known as
EET, “Not in Employment, Education or Training ” at ages 17, 19 and
5; and the total duration of unemployment over the 10 years to Au-
ust 2015, when they are aged 25. We analyse total weekly earnings of
hose who have left full-time education at age 17 (including the zeroes
or all those with no labour market earnings), enabling us to determine
hether there is any human capital or signalling beneﬁt to part-time
ork experience at this earliest opportunity to work full-time. For earn-
ngs at age 25, we again use a weekly measure including the zeroes for
hose not in employment, but also analyse hourly wages for those who
re, and the number of hours worked. We also analyse whether, by age
5, the student is in a Higher or Lower Managerial or Professional Oc-
upation (Categories 1 and 2 in the National Statistics Socio-economic
lassiﬁcation), or is self-employed (a “small employer or own account
orker ” - category 4). Finally, we use the count of items (out of 12) in-
icating poor mental health in General Health Questionnaire, which we
bserve at ages 17 and 25, to represent wider eﬀects on wellbeing. 2 We2 Respondents are also asked about their “general health ” at both ages 17 and 
5, but this is elicited using a diﬀerent number of and diﬀerently worded cat- 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics by gender. 
Wave 1 (age 14) Wave 2 (age 15) 
Male Female Male Female 
Employed 25.26 19.30 28.74 27.20 
(%) 
Observations 7,645 7,349 6,620 6,399 
In Work: Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Hours and earnings 1 
Mean hours 4.13 · 4.16 · 5.13 · 5.35 ·
employment (3.42) (3.18) (4.09) (3.65) 
Mean 14.43 · 14.18 · 20.53 · 18.83 ·
earnings, £ (13.80) (11.78) (17.59) (11.83) 
Other inputs 2 
Attitude 0.014 0.040 0.092 0.121 − 0.281 − 0.277 − 0.157 − 0.151 
Study − 0.145 − 0.189 − 0.155 − 0.119 − 0.052 − 0.083 0.064 0.019 
Active Leisure 0.491 0.326 − 0.069 − 0.294 0.414 0.223 − 0.0196 − 0.495 
Social Life 0.117 − 0.104 0.277 − 0.009 0.296 0.016 0.458 0.123 
Risky Behaviours 0.060 − 0.160 0.079 − 0.099 0.467 0.246 0.580 0.342 
Demographics 
Higher Educated 17.7 18.8 19.5 18.4 17.4 19.5 19.8 18.36 
parent (%) 
Lone Parent 21.3 27.2 23.5 26.4 20.4 27.9 21.8 27.5 
(%) Self-employed 12.2 9.4 12.8 9.4 11.1 9.0 11.8 8.8 
parent (%) 
Educational performance 
Mean KS2 (age 11) 27.44 26.73 27.91 27.03 27.37 26.79 28.02 26.86 
Average Point Score (3.82) (4.35) (3.37) (4.05) (3.85) (4.36) (3.36) (4.14) 
Mean GCSE (age 16) 374.90 356.37 411.50 393.24 371.65 348.497 415.92 383.03 
total score (150.40) (165.80) (136.48) (153.74) (152.41) (167.79) (132.68) (158.96) 
Observations 1,668 5,977 1,171 6,178 1,681 4,939 1,484 4,915 
Complete cases in 1,257 4,189 915 4,424 1,434 4,012 1,314 4,025 
input factor models 
Notes: Standard deviations of continuous variables in parentheses. Population means, proportions and standard devi- 
ations estimated using age-14 population probability weights and account for clustering at the school level. 1 : Time 
use and earnings are per week. 2 ‘Other inputs’ are all measured as the z -score of the principal component from the 
factor models. See Tables 2 and 3 . 
Fig. 1. Part-time work prevalence by 
parental income decile. 
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Table 2 
Factor loadings and cut points in ordered logit measurement models. 
Factor loadings: 
Attitude Study Active Leisure Social Life Risky Behaviour 
Work hard 1 Not truant 1 Play sport 1 Nightclub 1 Smoke 1 
Worth it 0.832 Homework 1.453 School sport 0.687 Pub or bar 0.700 Alcohol 0.594 
(0.020) (0.080) (0.025) (0.046) (0.022) 
Work waste 0.954 Outside 2.500 Sport in gen 0.903 Concert 0.336 Cannabis 1.347 
(0.025) (0.251) (0.027) (0.018) (0.074) 
Interest 1.228 Study club 2.563 School clubs 0.329 Arcade 0.647 
(0.027) (0.249) (0.015) (0.046) 
Play music 0.186 Friends out 0.442 
( − 0.257) (0.027) 
Cut Points: 
Attitude Study Active Leisure Social Life Risky Behaviour 
Work hard Not truant Play sport Nightclub Smoke 
1 − 5.028 1 − 1.511 1 − 0.257 1 1.303 1 3.422 
2 − 2.048 School sport 
3 − 1.992 1 0.250 
4 − 1.898 2 0.917 
5 1.404 3 3.020 Pub or bar Alcohol 
6 1.467 4 4.684 1 2.222 1 0.126 
Worth it Homework Sport in gen 2 0.882 
1 − 3.888 1 − 2.101 1 − 3.683 3 0.927 
2 − 2.996 2 − 1.376 2 − 2.596 4 0.971 
3 0.197 3 0.002 3 − 2.010 Concert 5 1.578 
4 0.053 4 1.183 4 − 0.699 1 0.045 6 2.118 
5 0.078 5 2.530 5 − 0.695 7 3.260 
6 0.103 6 − 0.691 8 5.797 
Work waste Outside 7 1.136 
1 − 4.642 1 0.497 School clubs Arcade Cannabis 
2 − 3.07 2 1.620 1 0.553 1 2.014 1 4.418 
3 0.584 3 3.827 2 1.059 
4 0.641 4 6.028 3 3.068 
5 0.685 4 4.946 
6 0.740 
Interest Study club Play music Friends out 
1 − 5.148 1 1.099 1 1.437 1 − 1.390 
2 − 2.134 2 2.054 2 0.246 
3 − 2.013 3 4.056 3 0.255 
4 − 1.854 4 5.626 4 1.509 
5 − 1.710 
6 2.953 
Variance: 
Attitude 2.414 Study 0.263 Active Leisure 4.454 Social Life 2.489 Risky 7.032 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses. Measures are deﬁned as follows. Attitude: ‘Work hard’ : “I work 
as hard as I can in school ”. ‘Worth it’ : “School work is worth doing ”. ‘Work waste’ : “The work I do in lessons is a waste of time ”
(recoded). ‘Interest’ : “The work I do in lessons is interesting to me ”. Study : ‘Not truant’ : Student has not truanted in last 12 
months (dummy variable). ‘Homework’ : Estimate of hours per week spent doing homework, based on reported time spent on a 
computer doing schoolwork, nights per week doing so, and nights per week doing any homework. (Categories are zero, 1 to under 
2 h, 2 to under 4, 4 to under 6, 6 to under 10, and 10 or more). ‘Outside’ : Works towards exams with teachers outside of lessons 
(frequency on 5-point scale). ‘Study club’ : Attends school study clubs (frequency on 5-point scale). Active Leisure : ‘Play sport’ : 
Played any kind of sport in the last four weeks (dummy). ‘School sport’ : Frequency of using school sports facilities (5-point scale). 
‘Sport in gen’ : Frequency of doing sport (5-point scale). ‘School clubs’ : Frequency of participation in school clubs or societies. 
(5-point scale). ‘Play music’ : Played a musical instrument in the last four weeks. Social Life : ‘Nightclub’ : Gone to a party, dance, 
nightclub or disco in the last four weeks. ‘Pub or bar’ : Gone to a pub or bar in the last four weeks. ‘Concert’ : Gone to a cinema, 
theatre or concert in the last four weeks. ‘Arcade’ : Gone to an amusement arcade in the last four weeks. ‘Friends out’ : How many 
times gone out with friends in last seven days. Risky behaviours : ‘Smoke’ : Whether cohort member “ever smokes ” (dummy 
variable). ‘Alcohol’ : Frequency of alcohol consumption (6-point scale). ‘Cannabis’ : Whether cohort member “ever tried cannabis ”
(dummy variable). ‘Don’t know’ is coded as the within-wave mean, creating up to three extra categories for the following measures: 
Work hard (3rd, 4th, 6th categories), Worth it (4rd–6th), Work waste (4th–6th), Interest (3rd–5th), Sport in gen’ (5th-6th), Friends 
out (3rd), Alcohol (3rd, 4th, 6th). 
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m  ight expect a negative eﬀect on health stemming from selection into
isky behaviours and a reduction in active leisure, though any resulting
eduction in schooling may also be a channel if reduced education levels
esults in fewer behavioural investments in health ( Cutler and Lleras-
uney, 2010 ) or more frequent experience of stressful circumstances
uch as unemployment ( Audhoe et al., 2010 ). gories so are not comparable. Results using threshold measures are presented 
n Appendix A.5 . 
t  
o  
p  Population means and standard deviations for each of these out-
omes are presented in Tables 8 and 9 with the estimated total and di-
ect eﬀects of teenage part-time work, for ease of interpretation of their
agnitudes. On average, females have stronger educational retention,
ower probabilities of being NEET and shorter accumulated unemploy-
ent durations, but lower hourly and weekly earnings and hours of work
han males. Females are marginally more likely to be in a Managerial
r Professional occupation at age 25, but are less likely (4.5 percentage
oints, or 64%) to be a small employer or own account worker. Females
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Table 3 
Interpretations of a one standard deviation change in each latent factor. 
Input Measure Interpretation Baseline 
Attitude 
A 1 s.d. change on average is equivalent to all of: 
Work hard 33.4 p.pt more likely to ‘strongly agree’ that “I always 26.1% strongly agree 
work hard in school ”
Worth it 29.2 p.pt more likely to ‘strongly agree’ that “School work is 47.3% strongly agree 
worth doing ”. 
Work waste 35.4 p.pt more likely to ‘strongly disagree’ that “The work I do 36.6% strongly disagree 
in lessons is a waste of time ”. 
Interest 21.4 p.pt more likely to ‘strongly agree’ that “The work I do in 12.7% strongly agree 
lessons is interesting to me ”. 
Study 
A 1 s.d. change on average is equivalent to all of: 
Not truant 6.4 p.pt less likely to have truanted in the last year. 19.2% answer yes. 
Homework 1 h additional homework per week. Median response: ≥ 4, < 6 h p.w. 
Outside 1 extra visit to work with teacher outside lessons per week. Median: Never; 75th% ile : < 1 p.w. 
Study club 1 extra visit to school study clubs per week. Median: Never; 75th% ile : < 1 p.w. 
Active Leisure 
A 1 s.d. change on average is equivalent to all of: 
Play sport 33.4 p.pt more likely to have played any kind of sport in the last 53.9% answer yes. 
four weeks. 
School sport 1.5 additional occasions to use school sport facilities each week. Median: Never; 75th% ile : 1–2 p.w. 
Sport in gen Move from “hardly ever ” participate in sport to once per week or 25th% ile : 1 p.w.; Median: > 1 p.w.; 
move from once per week to several but not “most ” days per week. 75th% ile : “Most days ”
School clubs 0.5 additional occasions to participate in other school clubs each Median: Never; 75th% ile : 1–2 p.w. 
week. 
Play music 6.8 p.pt more likely to have played a musical instrument in the 19.9% answer yes. 
last four weeks. 
Social Life 
A 1 s.d. change on average is equivalent to all of: 
Nightclub 35.5 p.pt more likely to have gone to a party, dance, nightclub or 28.8% mention. 
disco in last four weeks. 
Pub or bar 14.9 p.pt more likely to have gone to a pub or bar in the last 13.8% mention. 
four weeks. 
Concert 13.0 p.pt more likely to have gone to a cinema, theatre or concert 49.0% mention. 
in the last four weeks. 
Arcade 15.3 p.pt more likely to have gone to an amusement arcade in the 15.5% mention. 
last four weeks. 
Friends out 1 additional trip out with friends in last week. Median: 1–2 p.w.; 75th% ile : 3–5 p.w. 
Risky Behaviours 
A 1 s.d. change on average is equivalent to all of: 
Smoke 29.8 p.pt more likely to “ever smoke ”. 14.0% answer yes 
Alcohol 34.7 p.pt more likely to ever consume alcohol. (Conditional on some 52.2% never consume alcohol 
consumption: More than double frequency: bi-monthly to monthly/ 75th% ile : once every 2 months; 
monthly to 2–3 times per month/2-3 per month to 1–2 per week). 90th% ile : 2–3 p.m. 
Cannabis 28.8 p.pt more likely to have “ever tried cannabis ”. 13.3% answer yes 
Abbreviations: “p.pt ” = “percentage point ”. “p.w ” = “‘per week ”. “p.m ” = “per month ”. “% ile ” = “percentile ”. Note: Changes expressed 
as percentage point change in unconditional probability that condition is met due to a uniform one standard deviation change in the 
latent input across the entire pooled sample population, from the levels observed in the data. 
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i  ave markedly worse mental health than males at age 17 (almost one
dditional item indicating poor health), but this remains stable to age
5, while that of males deteriorates to almost the same level. 
. Identiﬁcation strategy 
.1. Empirical models 
We distinguish between the total and direct eﬀects of employment on
cademic performance and labour market outcomes. The total or ‘pol-
cy eﬀect’ includes indirect eﬀects of part-time work via inputs crowded
ut or facilitated by employment. This is a parameter of interest to pol-
cymakers who, for example, may mandate the maximum hours of paid
ork for teenagers, but not for minimum hours of study outside school.
he ‘production function parameter’ is the direct eﬀect of part-time
ork, holding other inputs constant. 
Following Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2009) ’s approach to the tech-
ology of human capital formation we adopt a cumulative model, la-
elling our outcome variable as Y iT , measured in the ﬁnal period (time
 ). We label hours of employment per week as L , and a vector ofit ther inputs into the production function during compulsory schooling
s S 𝑖𝑡 , for the periods of compulsory schooling 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 ′. X 𝑖 includes
ny socio-economic, demographic and school characteristics and prior
ducational performances, that we expect directly to aﬀect individuals’
cademic and labour market performance. In this framework the policy
ﬀect is equal to 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
in the following speciﬁcation: 
 𝑖𝑇 = 
𝑇 ′∑
𝑡 =1 
[ 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
𝐿 𝑖𝑡 ] + 𝝍 X 𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖𝑇 (1)
hile the production function parameter is equal to 𝜋𝐿 
𝑡 
in the following
peciﬁcation: 
 𝑖𝑇 = 
𝑇 ′∑
𝑡 =1 
[ 𝜋𝐿 
𝑡 
𝐿 𝑖𝑡 + 𝝅𝑆 𝑡 S 𝑖𝑡 ] + 𝜷X 𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑇 (2)
here are two potential barriers to obtaining unbiased estimates. Firstly,
e could expect some unobservable characteristic to determine selec-
ion into both employment and other productive activities, such that
[ 𝜁𝑖𝑇 |L 𝑖 , X 𝑖 ] ≠ 0 and 𝐸[ 𝜖𝑖𝑇 |L 𝑖 , S 𝑖 , X 𝑖 ] ≠ 0 . Secondly, there may be mea-
urement error in teenagers’ hours of work and other investment activ-
ties, which will attenuate the OLS coeﬃcient on these variables ( Tyler,
A. Holford Labour Economics 63 (2020) 101806 
Fig. 2. Part-time work prevalence by 
parental subjective ﬁnancial situation. 
Table 4 
Educational and occupational aspirations by child’s employment status. 
Wave 1 (age 14) Wave 2 (age 15) 
Male Female Male Female 
In Work: Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Educational aspirations Parent intends child to stay in 72.36 77.16 88.12 88.39 70.57 74.76 88.00 88.13 
full-time education at 16, (%) (1.37) (0.89) (1.07) (0.58) (1.41) (1.00) (0.97) (0.67) 
Child intends to stay in 76.16 78.51 91.01 88.56 75.79 77.49 91.00 90.72 
full-time education at 16, (%) (1.23) (0.87) (0.89) (0.56) (1.32) (0.97) (0.79) (0.58) 
Child “very ” likely 28.60 32.05 36.81 37.19 26.09 27.95 33.39 37.94 
to apply to university, (%) (1.50) (1.17) (1.77) (1.20) (1.52) (1.32) (1.57) (1.42) 
Occupational aspirations 
Percent for whom each factor matters “a lot ”: 
To have a job which pays well 69.42 71.20 57.59 61.81 . . . . 
(1.25) (0.77) (1.54) (0.87) . . . . 
To be my own boss or have my 26.30 28.73 14.07 18.88 . . . . 
own business (1.15) (0.83) (1.04) (0.67) . . . . 
To have a job that’s 70.93 70.81 67.05 67.29 . . . . 
interesting (1.21) (0.79) (1.53) (0.78) . . . . 
To have a job where I can 64.87 62.73 49.49 55.10 . . . . 
get promoted (1.32) (0.86) (1.67) (1.67) . . . . 
To have a job with regular 46.02 46.50 45.16 46.00 . . . . 
hours (1.35) (0.08) (1.52) (0.83) . . . . 
N: 1,668 5,977 1,171 6,178 1,681 4,939 1,484 4,915 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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3 Accounting for the censoring of hours of employment at zero in this way will 
improve the precision of our second stage estimates over those that would be 
obtained from a linear IV speciﬁcation, without aﬀecting its bias or consistency 
properties. 003 ). To address these barriers, we exploit variation over time and
mong individuals in two local labour market characteristics as instru-
ental variables for children’s hours of employment Z 𝑖𝑡 , and include a
ich set of additional controls that vary at the same school or neighbour-
ood level ( N 𝑖 ). 
Hence the policy eﬀect equation we estimate can be written: 
[ 𝑌 𝑖𝑇 |Z 𝑖 , X 𝑖 , N 𝑖 ] = 
𝑇 ′∑
𝑡 =1 
[ 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
𝐸[ 𝐿 𝑖𝑡 |Z 𝑖𝑡 , X 𝑖 , N 𝑖 ]] + 𝝍 𝑋 X 𝑖 + 𝝍 𝑁 N 𝑖 (3)
nd the production function equation as: 
[ 𝑌 𝑖𝑇 |Z 𝑖 , X 𝑖 , N 𝑖 ] = 
𝑇 ′∑
𝑡 =1 
[ 𝜋𝐿 
𝑡 
𝐸[ 𝐿 𝑖𝑡 |Z 𝑖𝑡 , X 𝑖 , N 𝑖 ] + 𝝅𝑆 𝑡 S 𝑖𝑡 ] + 𝜷𝑋 X 𝑖 + 𝜷𝑁 N 𝑖 (4)e use Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) with the ‘condi-
ional mixed process’ ( “cmp ”) program in Stata ( Roodman, 2011 ) simul-
aneously to estimate ﬁrst-stage tobit equations for hours of employment
er week at both ages 14 and 15 with a ﬁnal stage equation carrying
he appropriate likelihood function for the dependent variable; either
inear, probit or tobit. 3 The policy eﬀect results on educational perfor-
ance obtained with our full set of covariates are shown in columns
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Table 5 
Policy eﬀect speciﬁcations for eﬀect of part-time work on age 16 educational performance. 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Individual Plus Local Plus school Plus prior Plus prior Individual Plus Local Plus school Plus prior Plus prior 
demograph- Authority controls and perform- perform- demograph- Authority controls and perform- perform- 
ics only counter- teaching ance at ance at ics only counter- teaching ance at ance at 
parts resources age 11 age 14 (Full) parts resources age 11 age 14 (Full) 
Second-stage for age 16 educational performance: (GCSE z -score) 
Hours per week − 0.032 ∗ − 0.029 ∗ − 0.029 ∗ ∗ − 0.033 ∗ ∗ − 0.025 ∗ ∗ − 0.051 ∗ ∗ − 0.045 − 0.046 − 0.045 − 0.067 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
in paid work, (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.048) (0.017) 
age 15/Wave 2 
Hours per week 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.029 0.022 − 0.024 − 0.025 − 0.037 − 0.019 0.020 
in paid work, (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.049) (0.017) 
age 14/Wave 1 
First-stage for Wave 2 / Age 15 h of employment per week: 
Age 18–24 − 0.524 − 9.417 − 13.466 − 13.490 − 13.567 − 33.934 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 44.231 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 23.892 − 22.436 − 23.657 
claimant count (11.888) (16.340) (16.770) (16.527) (16.643) (11.271) (14.817) (15.051) (15.915) (14.874) 
unemp’ rate 
SIC G/H VAT- 0.176 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.217 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.216 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.211 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.211 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.138 ∗ 0.144 ∗ ∗ 0.145 ∗ 0.130 ∗ 
registered (0.045) (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.039) (0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.069) 
businesses 
per 100 youths 
First-stage for Wave 1 / Age 14 h of employment per week: 
Age 18–24 2.520 − 1.858 − 7.709 − 8.111 − 7.950 − 14.752 − 9.167 1.284 1.225 − 1.287 
claimant count (9.560) (13.672) (13.875) (13.874) (13.787) (12.134) (16.469) (16.695) (17.278) (16.630) 
unemp’ rate 
SIC G/H VAT- 0.121 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.082 0.115 ∗ 0.121 ∗ 0.121 ∗ 0.105 ∗ ∗ 0.052 0.065 0.071 0.079 
registered (0.041) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.041) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
businesses per 100 youths 
Observations 5446 5446 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 5339 5339 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
Table 6 
Coeﬃcient on hours of employment per week in IV regression for other uses of time (measured in standard deviations). 
Attitude Study Active Leisure Social Life Risky Behaviours 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Age 15 h of part- 
time Work per week − 0.033 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ − 0.021 ∗ − 0.027 ∗ − 0.057 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.020 ∗ 0.013 0.015 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.031 ∗ ∗ 
Standard error: (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
p -value (unadjusted) 0.010 0.014 0.072 0.067 0.000 0.054 0.200 0.200 0.001 0.022 
p -value (adjusted for 0.037 ## 0.056 # 0.245 0.221 0.000 ### 0.168 0.543 0.549 0.004 ### 0.063 # 
multiple hypothesis testing) # 
r(.k) (Average correlation 0.170 0.122 0.176 0.203 0.225 0.256 0.220 0.210 0.165 0.331 
of other four 
dependent variables) 
Observations 5446 5339 5446 5339 5446 5339 5446 5339 5446 5339 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age- 
14 population probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. All coeﬃcients from single-factor-single-wave models. First stage 
equation for hours of employment not shown. Eﬀect of hours of employment is identiﬁed by exclusion of labour market variables from second stage. # 
Adjusted p -values account for testing of multiple hypotheses using the following modiﬁed Bonferroni Adjustment: 𝑝 𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝 ( 𝑘 )) 𝑔( 𝑘 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑔( 𝑘 ) = 
𝑀 1− 𝑟 ( .𝑘 ) , where M is the number of outcomes being tested (here 5 for each sex), p ( k ) is the unadjusted p -value for the k th outcome and r (. k ) is the mean 
of the (absolute) pairwise correlations between all the outcomes other than k . (See Sankoh et al., 1997 , pp.2534–2535, for discussion). 
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t  5) and (10) of Table 5 , and production function estimates are shown in
olumns (2) and (4) of Table 7 . The policy eﬀect and production func-
ion parameter results on age 17 and 19 labour market outcomes are
hown in Table 8 , and age 25 outcomes in Table 9 . We do not estimate
he Mincer functions that are standard in the literature on returns to ed-
cation and experience, because the durations of these are endogenous.
The diﬀerence between the policy eﬀect 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
and production function
arameter 𝜋𝐿 
𝑡 
is driven by changes in the other inputs S 𝑖𝑡 resulting from
hanges in part-time work. We estimate instrumental variables models
or the eﬀect of part-time work on each of these inputs: 
[ 𝑠 𝑞 
𝑖𝑡 
|Z 𝑖𝑡 , X 𝑖 ] = 𝛾𝑞 𝑡 𝐸[ 𝐿 𝑖𝑡 |Z 𝑖𝑡 , X 𝑖 , N 𝑖 ] + 𝜽𝑞 𝑡 X 𝑖 (5)
n Eq. (5) , the parameters 𝛾
𝑞 
𝑡 
represent the crowd-out (or facilitation) of
actor 𝑠 
𝑞 
by hours of employment. These are presented in Table 6 . 𝑖𝑡 .2. Instrumental variables 
Our instruments are the (i) age 18–24 claimant count unemployment
ate in month of interview, and (ii) density of small business registered
or Value Added Tax (VAT) in the “Wholesale and retail trade, repair
f motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods ” (G)
nd “Hotels and restaurants ” (H) sectors of the Standard Industrial Clas-
iﬁcation (SIC). 
Both are measured in the Local Authority District (LAD) of residence.
hese have an average population of 164,000 and size of 155 square
iles, 1.6 times the average population but 12.5% of the average area
f a US county, the smallest geography used in the US literature with
his method ( Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010 ). This local measure is ap-
ropriate for these teenagers, who will be reliant on parental or public
ransport, or cycle-or-walkable distances. (The youngest age at which
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Table 7 
Production function speciﬁcations for eﬀect of part-time work on age 16 educational perfor- 
mance. Second stage coeﬃcients. 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS IV for Work Hours OLS IV for Work Hours 
Work Hours age 15 − 0.003 − 0.010 − 0.004 − 0.038 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.029) 
Work Hours age 14 0.004 0.015 − 0.002 0.007 
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.027) 
Attitude age 15 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.062 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.061 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
Attitude age 14 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.018 0.019 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Study age 15 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.066 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.064 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Study age 14 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Active Leisure age 15 0.062 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.062 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.051 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Active Leisure age 14 − 0.025 ∗ − 0.025 ∗ ∗ − 0.014 − 0.014 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Social Life age 15 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.019 ∗ − 0.019 ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Social Life age 14 − 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Risky Behaviours age 15 − 0.080 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.078 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Risky Behaviours age 14 − 0.019 − 0.019 − 0.019 − 0.020 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Observations 5446 5446 5339 5339 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Observations 
shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population probability weights 
and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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4 School characteristics are available linked to the Next Steps Survey 
in its Secure Access version. The author linked teacher characteristics at 
the LAD-by-school-type level using publicly available “Schools, pupils and 
their characteristics ” data from the Department for Education website, ne may learn to drive in England is 17). Moreover, our age restriction
n unemployment should increase precision. Even children not intend-
ng to invest in a connection to the adult labour market may be working
n jobs for which they are close substitutes for young adult employ-
es ( Hobbs et al., 2007 ). A reduction in the youth unemployment rate
ay bid-up the young adult wage rate, or make young adults less pre-
ared to work ﬂexibly or for few hours per week. In either case this
akes it more attractive for employers to hire children on an informal
asis. 
VAT registrations are published by the Department for Business, In-
ovation and Skills as the oﬃcial record of business start-ups and clo-
ures (see Oﬃce for National Statistics, 2008 ). Our instrument is the
tock of these businesses in sectors G and H per 100 18–24 year-olds
esident in the LAD. It is well documented from numerous targeted sur-
eys that the employment of individuals in full-time education in the
K is concentrated in these sectors ( Curtis and Lucas, 2001; Howieson-
athy. et al., 2006; McKechnieJim. et al., 2011; Mizen et al., 1999 ). 
On average teenagers in our samples face a local youth (18–24) un-
mployment rate of 4.25%, and there are just over 10 VAT-registered
nterprises in the relevant sectors per 100 youths. There is signiﬁcant
etween-variation in both instruments at both points in time, with those
t the 75th percentile facing local youth unemployment and density of
elevant employers that are twice as high (5.8% versus 2.8%, and 12.8
ersus 6 per 100 youths at age 15 respectively) as those on the 25th
ercentile, for example. 
It is possible that local youth labour market opportunities are cor-
elated with school characteristics and resources that are productive
or educational performance and hence subsequent labour market out-
omes. It is also possible that local labour market conditions aﬀect stu-
ents’ perceived relative return to eﬀort at school versus accumulating
abour market experience, and to continuing in post-compulsory edu-
ation versus transitioning into full-time work. We therefore control
or a rich set of characteristics of the school each child is attending,
hnd for several measures of teacher numbers and quality for schools
f the same type in the same Local Education Authority. 4 We describe
hese variables and show population means and standard deviations in
ppendix A.3 . 
We might still be concerned if, conditional on all these individual,
eighbourhood, and school characteristics, the instruments help predict
ther behaviours and attitudes relevant to the decision to exert eﬀort at
chool or continue into post-compulsory education. In Appendix A.4 we
escribe tests for eﬀects on (i) qualiﬁcation subject choices and (ii)
ntentions to remain in full-time education, from which we found no
vidence to question the validity of our ﬁnal empirical speciﬁcations.
olumns (1–4) and (6–9) of Table 5 also show that the estimated policy
ﬀect of part-time work on educational performance results is highly
obust to the progressive inclusion Local Authority, school and teacher
ontrols. 
. Results 
.1. Eﬀects of the instruments on part-time work 
The middle and bottom panels of Table 5 show the ﬁrst stage tobit
oeﬃcients from Eq. (3) on the instruments for part-time working hours
t age 14 and 15, for speciﬁcations adding progressively more controls.
The coeﬃcients on all remaining explanatory variables included in the
nal speciﬁcation, columns (5) and (10) are shown in Appendix A.7 ).
t age 14, the youth unemployment rate has no signiﬁcant eﬀect onttps://tinyurl.com/y2ranhj3 , accessed 1st July 2019. 
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Table 8 
Population means, policy eﬀects and production function parameters for age 17 and 19 outcomes. 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep’ var Policy Prod’n func Prod’n func Dep’ var Policy Prod’n func Prod’n func 
mean (sd)/ effect incl. GCSE plus age 14/15 mean (sd)/ effect incl. GCSE plus age 14/15 
proportion (s.e.) z -score (s.e.) inputs (s.e.) proportion (s.e.) z -score (s.e.) (s.e.) 
2nd stage n (p adj ) (p adj ) (p adj ) 2nd stage n (p adj ) (p adj ) (p adj ) 
Age 17 outcomes 
In full-time education 0.715 0.786 
or training n = 5197 n = 5088 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.014 ∗ ∗ − 0.012 ∗ ∗ 0.008 0.011 0.011 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
(0.012)## (0.048)## (0.110) (0.725) (0.288) (0.288) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.153 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.135 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.108 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
NEET: Not in employment, 0.116 0.095 
education or training n = 5197 n = 5088 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.005 − 0.006 − 0.006 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
(0.992) (0.920) (0.920) (0.484) (0.329) (0.329) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.080 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.068 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Weekly gross earnings 83.47 69.78 
(If left FT education) (95.77) (112.97) 
n = 1031 n = 755 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.629 0.603 0.233 3.582 ∗ ∗ 3.643 ∗ ∗ 3.400 ∗ ∗ 
(1.602) (1.593) (1.602) (1.574) (1.542) (1.586) 
(0.974) (0.976) (0.999) (0.071)# (0.056)# (0.098)# 
GCSE total points, z -score 4.089 5.204 10.595 ∗ 4.427 
(5.254) (5.479) (5.771) (6.429) 
Poor health 1.571 2.497 
(GHQ, items out of 12) (2.311) (2.974) 
n = 4891 n = 4784 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.083 0.067 0.008 0.040 0.033 0.022 
(0.249) (0.186) (0.085) (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) 
(0.920) (0.908) (0.992) (0.714) (0.789) (0.889) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.166 ∗ 0.058 − 0.390 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.198 ∗ 
(0.086) (0.085) (0.106) (0.107) 
Age 19 outcomes 
At college 0.463 0.495 
or university n = 4268 n = 4408 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.010 − 0.009 − 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.011 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
(0.426) (0.521) (0.690) (0.252) (0.370) (0.265) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.132 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.142 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.114 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
At university 0.252 0.323 
n = 4268 n = 4408 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.004 − 0.003 0.000 0.009 ∗ 0.009 0.010 ∗ 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
(0.729) (0.907) (1.000) (0.187) (0.281) (0.206) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.130 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.118 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
NEET: Not in employment, 0.105 0.057 
education or training n = 4268 n = 4135 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.002 0.004 0.005 − 0.009 − 0.011 − 0.009 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
(0.851) (0.563) (0.436) (0.147) (0.961) (0.344) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.058 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.048 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.046 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Notes: First stage sample size n is 5446 for males and 5339 for females for all speciﬁcations. ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, 
above p -value adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing of outcomes measured at the same age in bold and parentheses (see procedure in Table 6 ). #: p < 0.1; 
##: p < 0.05 ###: p < 0.01; all adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 
population probability weights and clustering at the school level. 
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e  he part-time working hours of males or females. This is consistent with
hildren this age not being close substitutes for young adult workers, or
he jobs they do not being suitable for adult workers (such as a weekly
elivery round). The age 14 density of SIC G or H businesses has a pos-
tive eﬀect that is stable but only marginally signiﬁcant for males, and
maller and insigniﬁcant for girls when anything beyond individual de-
ographics are included. At age 15 the local youth unemployment rate is never signiﬁcant
or boys, though takes on a large magnitude of eﬀect size once school
nd teaching resources are included in the model, of around 0.13 h per
ercentage point lower unemployment rate. For girls, the corresponding
oeﬃcient is always larger, but it loses signiﬁcance with Local Author-
ty, school and teacher controls. We see a signiﬁcant and stable positive
ﬀect of SIC G or H businesses on the working hours of both boys and
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Table 9 
Population means, policy eﬀects and production function parameters for age 25 outcomes. 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep’ var Policy Prod’n func Prod’n func Dep’ var Policy Prod’n func Prod’n func 
mean (sd)/ effect incl. GCSE plus age 14/15 mean (sd)/ effect incl. GCSE plus age 14/15 
proportion (s.e.) z -score (s.e.) inputs (s.e.) proportion (s.e.) z -score (s.e.) (s.e.) 
2nd stage n (p adj ) (p adj ) (p adj ) 2nd stage n (p adj ) (p adj ) (p adj ) 
Age 25 outcomes 
NEET: Not in employment, 0.080 0.054 
education or training n = 2715 n = 3397 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.008 0.011 ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
(0.627) (0.140) (0.220) (0.992) (0.990) (0.971) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.072 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.060 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) 
Total duration of unemployment, 7.75 4.89 
months, Sept 2006-Aug 2015 (18.18) (15.90) 
n = 2715 n = 3397 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 2.000 ∗ ∗ − 1.519 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.536 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.425 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.174 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.197 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.781) (0.315) (0.308) (0.383) (0.293) (0.272) 
(0.049)## (0.000)### (0.000)### (0.000)### (0.000)### (0.000)### 
GCSE total points, z -score − 3.311 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 3.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.777 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.840 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.817) (0.871) (1.480) (1.397) 
Weekly net 275.68 211.29 
earnings (All) (210.31) (178.59) 
n = 2678 n = 3345 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.333 3.060 3.661 − 3.450 − 7.262 − 6.024 
(6.025) (4.815) (4.525) (3.874) (4.458) (4.395) 
(1.000) (0.987) (0.959) (0.944) (0.490) (0.684) 
GCSE total points, z -score 64.359 ∗ ∗ ∗ 57.635 ∗ ∗ ∗ 59.955 ∗ ∗ ∗ 57.413 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(11.817) (11.144) (9.167) (9.297) 
Hourly net earnings 8.99 8.46 
(In Work only) (4.80) (4.58) 
n = 2203 n = 2569 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.269 ∗ 0.205 0.196 − 0.101 0.680 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.687 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.151) (0.142) (0.145) (0.090) (0.167) (0.159) 
(0.332) (0.571) (0.639) (0.810) (0.000)### (0.000)### 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.398 0.382 0.913 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.900 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.252) (0.250) (0.225) (0.228) 
Weekly hours of 34.28 27.42 
work (All) (19.56) (18.89) 
n = 2726 n = 3362 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.114 0.600 0.589 − 0.209 − 0.520 − 0.421 
(0.824) (0.568) (0.579) (0.368) (0.538) (0.516) 
(0.994) (0.862) (0.881) (0.994) (0.914) (0.961) 
GCSE total points, z -score 4.767 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.902 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.859 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.213 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.104) (1.079) (1.002) (1.021) 
Occupation: Managerial 0.320 0.340 
or professional n = 2704 n = 3296 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.019 ∗ ∗ − 0.001 − 0.000 0.011 0.016 ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
(0.117) (1.000) (1.000) (0.854) (0.237) (0.180) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.092 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.074 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
Occupation: Small employer 0.070 0.025 
or own account worker n = 2704 n = 3296 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.010 ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ 0.008 ∗ 0.003 − 0.001 − 0.001 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(0.063)# (0.208) (0.440) (0.746) (0.992) (0.992) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.005 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Poor health 2.289 2.53 
(GHQ, items out of 12) (3.209) (3.272) 
n = 2651 n = 3287 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.148 0.001 − 0.018 − 0.116 ∗ ∗ − 0.077 − 0.076 
(0.138) (0.146) (0.107) (0.051) (0.065) (0.061) 
(0.812) (1.000) (1.000) (0.108) (0.751) (0.709) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.227 − 0.108 − 0.376 ∗ ∗ − 0.262 
(0.173) (0.170) (0.163) (0.172) 
Notes: First stage sample size n is 5446 for males and 5339 for females for all speciﬁcations. ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, 
above p -value adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing of outcomes measured at the same age in bold and parentheses (see procedure in Table 6 ). #: p < 0.1; 
##: p < 0.05 ###: p < 0.01; all adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and clustering at the school level. Second stage equations for hours and earnings use a tobit speciﬁcation with these outcomes topcoded at the 
sample 99th percentiles, which are weekly earnings of £923, hourly earnings of £37.50, and 78 weekly hours of work). 
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a  irls, at around 0.2 and 0.13 additional hours per week worked per ad-
itional registration per 100 youths. 
Though insigniﬁcant, the magnitude of the gender-within-age, and
ge-within-gender diﬀerences in the age 18–24 unemployment coeﬃ-
ients suggest that girls are more likely than boys, and 15 year-olds
ore likely than 14 year-olds to be working in sectors where they work
longside young adult workers, and to be considered close substitutes
or them. 
All but the ‘demographics only’ speciﬁcations show we lack identify-
ng variation from local labour market conditions for the eﬀects of part-
ime work at age 14 on later outcomes. For the remainder of this paper
e therefore focus on the eﬀects of part-time work at age 15, by which
ge we do have signiﬁcant identifying variation driven by the density of
IC G and H small businesses. Given this, in our ﬁnal speciﬁcation we
ontrol in our second-stage equation for educational performance at age
4. Its inclusion ensures that the estimated coeﬃcients on employment
ours at age 15 capture solely the learning gain that occurs after age 14.
ll further estimates presented include the full set of covariates as used
n columns (5) and (10). 
We retain the ﬁrst-stage equation for age 14 employment, and keep
his variable in the second stage equation, for two reasons. Firstly, it
eans we observe and control for the initial condition - i.e. the employ-
ent decision in the ﬁrst academic year in which the child is legally
ermitted to work. Secondly, this Full Information Maximum Likelihood
peciﬁcation, by accounting for the correlation of errors among the ﬁrst
nd second stage equations, controls for any unobserved factors driving
hildren to take up part-time work at this earliest opportunity, which
ay be an important source of heterogeneity also driving educational
erformance. 
.2. Policy eﬀects on educational performance 
The top panel of Table 5 shows that the estimated total eﬀect ( 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
in
q. (3) ) of an additional hour of part-time work per week at age 15 on
he GCSE z -score is robust to the exact set of controls. In particular, ad-
itionally including prior educational performance at age 11 (columns
 and 9) makes little diﬀerence to the age 15 coeﬃcient for either boys
r girls. This shows that our instruments must be conditionally uncor-
elated with this predetermined measure of educational performance,
hich is supporting evidence of the validity of the instruments. Addi-
ionally controlling for age 14 educational performance in our preferred
peciﬁcation (columns 5 and 10), we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of age 15
art-time work for boys of 2.5% and girls of 6.7% of a standard devia-
ion per hour worked per week. 5 
Working the mean hours of employment (conditional on positive
ours) observed for 15 year-olds in this population, the expected overall
ﬀect would be to reduce a male’s GCSE z -score by 12% of a standard
eviation, and a female’s by 34.8%. The magnitude of this ﬁgure for
emales is about 50% larger than benchmark estimates for the eﬀect
f having a very high quality, rather than average, teacher ( Hanushek,
011 ), or the progress a 14–15 year-old in the United States is expected
o make in standardized tests over one year ( Hill et al., 2008 ). This
uggests that part-time work is highly disruptive to educational perfor-
ance. This makes it important to evaluate the mechanisms through
hich this occurs, and whether the deleterious eﬀect on educational
erformance at the end of compulsory schooling outweighs any bene-
ts in terms of human capital accumulation, for future labour market
utcomes. 5 The positive, though insigniﬁcant, coeﬃcient on age 14 part-time work for 
ales in column (4) is not in our preferred speciﬁcation but is identiﬁed. This 
uggests part-time work at age 14 earlier age may help accumulate skills without 
ﬀecting the allocation of time during the later periods in which the high-stakes 
ualiﬁcations are actually studied for. 
t  
d  
L  
a  
2  
n  
t  .3. Crowding out of other inputs 
In Table 6 we show estimates of 𝛾
𝑞 
𝑡 
from Eq. (5) , showing the contem-
oraneous crowd-out (or facilitation) of ﬁve other potential inputs ( 𝑠 
𝑞 
𝑖𝑡 
)
o the education production function, caused by an hour of part-time
ork per week at age 15. Three results stand out. Firstly, part-time work
educes schoolchildrens’ ‘Attitude’, i.e. motivation for schoolwork, with
n eﬀect size of approximately 3.5% of a standard deviation per hour,
nd ‘Study’ by a smaller, marginally signiﬁcant magnitude. Secondly,
art-time work crowds out the active leisure of males with an additional
our per week having an eﬀect size of 5.7% of a standard deviation,
lmost three times that for females. Thirdly, part-time work increases
oth males’ and females’ participation in risky behaviours, here mean-
ng consumption of illicit substances, by the margin of 3.8% and 3.1% of
 standard deviation per hour per week. Referring back to Table 3 , this
an be interpreted as a typical employment burden of 6 h per week rais-
ng the probability of ‘ever smoking’, ‘ever having tried cannabis’, and
ever consuming alcohol’ by approximately 6 percentage points each, or
y 50%, 50% and 20% respectively. By contrast, the eﬀects in relation
o non-risky social activities are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. 
.4. Production function parameters for educational performance 
In Table 7 we present estimates of the OLS and IV production func-
ion parameters for work hours and the additional inputs at ages 14 and
5 on the GCSE z -score ( 𝜋𝐿 
𝑡 
and 𝝅𝑆 
𝑡 
in Eqs. (2) and 4 ). These direct ef-
ects of work hours at age 15 are less negative for both males and females
han the estimated total eﬀects. Neither are statistically signiﬁcant, at
1 % of a standard deviation per hour for males and −3 . 8 % for females.
he latter remains a large eﬀect size. We do not have the identifying
ariation to produce IV estimates of the production function parame-
ers on the other inputs S it . However the negative causal relationship
etween part-time work and Attitude, Study and Active Leisure at age
5 in Table 6 and positive coeﬃcients on these variables in Table 7 , and
ice-versa for Risky Behaviours, are consistent with the larger negative
otal than direct eﬀects being due to changes in these inputs. 
.5. Policy eﬀects and production function parameters on labour market 
utcomes 
We now evaluate the eﬀects of part-time work at age 15 on educa-
ional retention and labour market outcomes beyond the end of compul-
ory schooling in Tables 8 (for outcomes measured at age 17 and age 19)
nd 9 (for outcomes measured at age 25). For each outcome variable,
olumns (1) and (5) list the estimated population mean or proportion,
tandard deviation (for continuous variables), and the raw sample size
rom which these are estimated. Columns (2) and (6) present the policy
ﬀects 𝜙𝐿 
𝑡 
from Eq. (3) . These include any indirect eﬀects via contem-
oraneous changes in behaviour, and endogenous changes in the GCSE
 -score. Columns (3) and (7) present the production function parameter
𝐿 
𝑡 
from a speciﬁcation of Eq. (4) , and the parameter 𝜋𝑌 
′
𝑡 
on the GCSE
 -score from age 16, with this included as the only factor in the vector
 it . Columns (4) and (8) present the same two parameters from a speci-
cation also including the age 14 and 15 inputs Attitude, Study, Active
eisure, Social Life, and Risky Behaviours in the vector S it . 
In this Full Information Maximum Likelihood framework, the ﬁrst
tages are estimated on the same sample as for educational performance
5446 males, 5339 females). The second stages are estimated on the
vailable sample at each age (shown in columns (1) and (5)), weighted
o the characteristics of this population when it was aged 14. We ad-
itionally control for the adult (aged 16–64) unemployment rate in the
ocal Authority District at time of interview, and up to ﬁve historical
nnual or ﬁve-year average rates to cover the entire period since June
006. Conditional on these, we assume that the density of small busi-
esses in just two sectors, and the youth unemployment rate between
wo and ten years earlier, will have no direct eﬀect on the subsequent
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o  utcomes. Moreover the degree of mobility between LADs in England
or this age group should make conditions in the origin district less rele-
ant. The Oﬃce for National Statistics (2016) estimates that on average,
8% of 19 year-olds will leave each Local Authority District in a given
ear Oﬃce for National Statistics (2016) . These will predominantly be
o attend university, but mobility remains high at 21% of 20 year-olds,
nd 12–15% of 21–25 year-olds, versus for example 4% of 17 year-olds
nd 5% of 40 year-olds. Abreu et al. (2015) estimate that 33% of grad-
ates move their place of employment by over 15km between 6 months
nd 3.5 years after graduation. 
Throughout Tables 8 and 9 we ﬁnd in most cases that the direct ef-
ect (production function parameter) of part-time work at age 15 is less
amaging or more beneﬁcial than the total or policy eﬀect. This is con-
istent with our ﬁnding in Tables 5 and 7 that part-time work has both
 negative total and direct eﬀect on the age-16 GCSE z -score, and our
xpectation that there is a positive causal relationship between educa-
ional and labour market performance. In other words, the damaging
hort-term eﬀect on educational performance reduces the longer-term
eneﬁts or increases the longer-term costs of part-time work, compared
ith its direct eﬀects through human capital accumulation or signalling.
owever, the diﬀerence between the total and direct eﬀect of part-time
ork is not usually quantitatively large or statistically signiﬁcant. 
We ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on early educational retention for males.
or each hour per week worked per week at age 15, a male is 1.7 (to-
al eﬀect) or 1.2 (direct eﬀect) percentage points less likely to be in
ull-time education at 17. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects for females, but
 consistent eﬀect size with each hour worked per week at age 15 in-
reasing their probability of being in full-time education at 17 and at
ollege or university at age 19 all by around 1 percentage point. These
esults are consistent with part-time work aﬀecting the performance of
emales from a suﬃciently high base that their decisions to continue in
ducation are not constrained. 
For those who have left full-time education by age 17, we ﬁnd no
igniﬁcant eﬀect of part-time work experience on weekly gross earnings
or males, but small positive total and direct eﬀects of approximately
3.50 for females. This suggests that having accumulated experience by
ge 16 does, for females, generate or signal human capital that is val-
ed by employers, and this outweighs any negative eﬀects of reduced
ducational performance. The lack of any eﬀect on educational reten-
ion for females means this not an artefact of ‘higher quality’ workers
eing induced to enter the labour market early due to their poorer exam
esults. 
Looking to longer term outcomes in Table 9 we ﬁnd the total or
olicy eﬀect of part-time work experience at age 15 is to reduce the
robability that males will end up in a ‘Managerial or Professional’ job
t age 25, by 2 percentage points per hour per week; and increases the
robability that they will be self-employed (a “small employer or own
ccount worker ”) by 1 percentage point. Corresponding eﬀects for fe-
ales are insigniﬁcant. However, for males we see a precisely estimated
ero and for females a larger positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect production
unction parameter for being ‘Managerial or Professional’. Table A8 in
ppendix A.7 shows a persistent long-run positive association of Atti-
ude to schoolwork with this outcome for both males and females. This
upports the crowd-out of Attitude to schoolwork by age 15 part-time
ork playing a role, both indirectly through its eﬀects on educational
erformance, and directly in negatively biasing the policy eﬀect for part-
ime work on this outcome relative to the production function parame-
er. 
Even more starkly, the total eﬀect of taking part-time work at age
5 is to increase the total duration of unemployment experience dur-
ng the ﬁrst 10 years of potential full-time labour market participation,
y 2 and 2.4 months per hour per week for males and females. Several
echanisms could explain this large eﬀect, including earlier dropout
rom full-time education for males, the reduction in educational perfor-
ance or an increase in the reservation wage. However, shutting down
he indirect eﬀect by controlling for the GCSE z -score in the productionunction produces negative (i.e. beneﬁcial) direct eﬀects of a similar
agnitude. 
We ﬁnd no eﬀect on total weekly earnings or hours of work where we
nclude zero values for those not in work, and a zero total eﬀect but large
ositive production function parameter for females’ hourly wages, with
n hour of part-time work per week at age 15 adding £0.70 to hourly
ages 10 years later. These results show that for females there are long-
un human capital or signalling beneﬁts of part-time work at age 15,
hat are almost exactly oﬀset by the detrimental eﬀect this has on ed-
cational performance. Note that the opposite-signed weekly (negative
nd insigniﬁcant) and hourly (positive and signiﬁcant) wage produc-
ion function parameters for women must therefore be reconciled by a
igher reservation wage and hence lower participation for females with
art-time work experience at age 15, rather than diﬀerences in working
ours at the intensive margin. 
Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects on mental health at age 17, a
mall (0.12 fewer items of poor health out of 12) and signiﬁcant ben-
ﬁcial policy eﬀect at age 25 for females, and larger but insigniﬁcant
etrimental policy eﬀect at age 25 for males, but no signiﬁcant or quan-
itatively large direct eﬀects at this age. The relation of these measures
o the other age 14–15 inputs, and robustness to alternative threshold
easures of health, or discussed in Appendix A.5 
. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have evaluated the total and direct eﬀects of part-
ime work at age 15 on performance in high-stakes qualiﬁcations taken
t age 16 in England, and on health, educational attainment, and labour
arket outcomes up to age 25. 
We ﬁnd large negative policy eﬀect sizes of − 2.5% and − 6.7% of a
tandard deviation in the GCSE z -score, per hour worked per week at
ge 15. We show robust evidence that a mechanism for this is part-time
ork reducing teenagers’ attitude to schoolwork, and to a smaller extent
heir study time outside of school. However, negative total and direct ef-
ects on educational retention at age 17 are only found for males, while
ositive total and direct eﬀects on age 17 earnings for those who do
rop out and on progression into Higher Education by age 19 are only
ound for females. Our long-run production function estimates show fe-
ales with part-time work experience at age 15 gaining higher hourly
arnings (by 0.70 per hour worked per week at age 15) and being more
ikely to enter a Managerial or Professional occupation at age 25 (by
.7 percentage points per hour worked per week at age 15). There are
orresponding zero eﬀects for males. 
Diﬀerences by sex in these eﬀects on educational retention, progres-
ion and labour market performance may reﬂect the stronger overall
erformance levels among girls at age 16, but females are also more
ikely to participate in retail and catering jobs and males in delivery.
he former are more likely to promote cognitive skills such as ﬁnancial
iteracy, mental arithmetic, and interpersonal skills that have long-run
ducational and labour market returns. Their pre-existing non-cognitive
raits may also make females more persistent in adapting their habits
e.g. to not procrastinate over schoolwork, even if no longer employed)
r upgrading their educational and occupational aspirations having ex-
erienced low-skilled work as a teenager. 
The exceptional result where a signiﬁcant eﬀect is found on males’,
ut not females’, subsequent labour market outcomes, is for the prob-
bility of entering self-employment (0.8% percentage points per hour
orked per week at age 15). We have shown this outcome ( “To be my
wn boss or have my own business ”), matters a lot to many more males
han females. 
The distinction between production function parameters and policy
ﬀects is very important for the interpretation and implications of our
esults. For example the skills obtained through age 15 part-time work
y females are beneﬁcial for entering Managerial and Professional occu-
ations, but somewhat oﬀset by reduced educational performance. An-
ther direct eﬀect of part-time work experience at age 15 is to reduce
A. Holford Labour Economics 63 (2020) 101806 
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T  nemployment duration for both males and females, but the damaging
otal eﬀects shows this beneﬁt is more than outweighed by the detri-
ental eﬀects of reduced educational performance. 
Teenagers in compulsory schooling with part-time jobs do not ap-
ear to be working out of ﬁnancial necessity. Nor are they taking these
ositions as a conscious investment ahead of their school-to-work tran-
ition. Nevertheless, for females, it appears to play this role well. In
ontrast, males at risk of dropping out of full-time education at the ear-
iest opportunity would be advised to ﬁnd work with more opportunities
or human capital acccumulation, or to focus on improving their perfor-
ance in the educational qualiﬁcations they will leave school with, as
his will make a larger diﬀerence in the long-run. 
ppendix A 
1. Compliance with regulations on child employment 
Those employing children are required to obtain the signature of
 parent and permit from the Local Education Authority (LEA), which
ust be satisﬁed that the child’s education will not be damaged. An ex-
mple of the application form and guidance for one Local Authority can
e seen at https://www.essex.gov.uk/child-employment/apply-for-a-
ork-permit (accessed 18th October 2019). Howieson et al. (2006) and
cKechnie et al. (2005) estimate only 14% of child workers in Scotland,
nd 15% in the county of Cumbria, England, had the required permit. 
McKechnie et al. (2011) and Hobbs et al. (2007) attribute this low
ompliance to a lack of resources among LEAs to provide information to
mployers or to undertake inspections; and a lack of awareness among
mployers of the law, of the possibility of detection, or the penalty if
etected. This penalty is in turn is somewhat mild (a maximum ﬁne of
1000), even if there are potentially more serious implications such as
nvalidating their insurance ( National Network for Children in Employ-
ent and Entertainment, 2019 ). McKechnie et al. (2011) and Hobbs
t al. (2007) also suggest that the evidence base on whether part-
ime work by schoolchildren does harm school outcomes needs to be
trengthened before regulatory enforcement or reform would become
 political priority, in light of concerns about burdens for small busi-esses and a prevailing view that work experience for children is a good
hing. 
2. Part-time work prevalence by parental occupation and education 
In Fig. A1 , parental occupation categories are ordered from 1
 “Higher Managerial and Professional ”) to 7 ( “Routine occupations ”)
nd 8 ( “Never worked and long-term unemployed ”). The gradient in par-
icipation is shallow apart from a signiﬁcant drop-oﬀ for those with the
eakest labour market attachment. Category 4 ( “Small employers and
wn-account workers ”) capture children of self-employed workers, who
re among the most likely to be in part-time work, and this is more ob-
ious for females than males, though the gaps are still small. In Fig. A2 ,
he children of parents with no educational qualiﬁcations are least likely
o be in part-time work, but there are only small diﬀerences by parental
ducation for those with GCSE-level qualiﬁcations or higher. 
3. School and neighbourhood level controls 
We control for whether the school is single-sex, selective, indepen-
ent (i.e. fee-paying), or a religious school. All thesefactors are likely
o aﬀect cohort members’ and teachers’ peer group quality and cost of
ﬀort. The school having a ‘sixth form’ would mean the cohort mem-
er could continue in full-time education after age 16 without chang-
ng institution, so may aﬀect the perceived costs of doing so, as well
s access to information, advice and guidance about Higher Educa-
ion. As measures of peer-group socio-economic and educational back-
round we control for the proportion of pupils entitled to Free School
eals (which is means-tested by parental income), who are not na-
ive English speakers, who have a Statement of Special Educational
eeds (SEN) or less serious documented SEN condition, and the eth-
ic composition of the school, along with two pre-determined mea-
ures of school quality: The average GCSE point score and age 11–16
alue-added measures for the 2004 cohort, two academic years above
he Next Steps cohort. As measures of school resourcing we control
or the number of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) teachers with Qualﬁed
eacher Status (QTS), and number of other teachers (the vast major-Fig. A1. Part-time work prevalence by 
parental occupation. 
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Fig. A2. Part-time work prevalence by 
parental qualiﬁcations. 
Fig. A3. Distribution of principal component of Attitude by wave and sex. 
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Fig. A4. Distribution of principal component of Study by wave and sex. 
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shown in Table A1 . 
7 These are all publicly available to download from the NOMIS interface of ty on programmes leading to QTS), per pupil. QTS accreditation re-
uires a postgraduate teacher-training qualiﬁcation involving school
xperience over a range of pupil ages. We also control for the num-
er of Teaching Assistants and Support Staﬀ per pupil; and the number
f qualiﬁed SEN support staﬀ per pupil with a SEN statement or SEN
ondition. 
We also control for LAD-level counterparts to all the household char-
cteristics in our model. These are the skills sub-domain of the Index
f Multiple Deprivation (a standardized measure of the prevalence of
dults with no or low qualiﬁcations) 6 , the proportion of adults aged
5–59 who received Disability Living Allowance, the number of full-6 This is publicly available from the National Archives at 
ttps://tinyurl.com/y6deqor7 . 
t
O
time and part-time jobs per 100 adult residents, and number of self-
mployed per 100 adult residents. 7 As measures of housing wealth, we
se the median selling price of houses in 2004–2006, and proportion of
wellings that are owner-occupied between 2012 and 2017 (the furthest
ack that data are available). 8 
Estimates of the population means and standard deviations arehe Oﬃce for National Statistics, at https://tinyurl.com/y64ty6sb . 
8 House Price data were downloaded from: https://tinyurl.com/y5eubb4a and 
wner Occupation rates from: https://tinyurl.com/y64zufue . The latter are es- 
imates and not oﬃcial statistics on dwelling stock by tenure. 
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Table A1 
Estimated population mean and standard deviation of additional control variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Authority District controls School controls School controls (cont’d) Teacher controls 
Skills sub-domain of 0.136 Single-sex, 0.089 Pupils with SEN 2.40 Qualiﬁed Teachers 0.089 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (0.602) (0.285) statement (%) (1.56) per pupil (0.050) 
Population aged 35–59 5.35 Selective 0.036 Pupils with SEN but 13.51 Other teachers per 0.006 
claiming Disability Living (2.10) (0.186) no statement (%) (8.30) pupil (0.007) 
Allowance (%) 
Full-time jobs per 100 44.62 Independent 0.075 (Sample members with missing 0.098 Teaching Assistants 0.009 
working age residents (5.46) (0.263) value for SEN prevalence) (0.297) per pupil (0.005) 
Part-time jobs per 100 15.62 Faith 0.211 Pupils entitled to Free 13.89 Support staff per 0.020 
working age residents (2.92) (0.408) School Meals (FSM), (%) (13.38) pupil (0.008) 
(Sample members with missing 0.046 Has a sixth-form 0.535 Pupils with English as 8.53 SEN support staff per 0.154 
value for full/part-time jobs) (0.212) (0.499) foreign language (16.37) pupil with SEN statement (0.008) 
Ethnicity: 
Self-Employed workers 9.03 2004 cohort mean 342.13 Indian, (%) 2.32 SEN support staff per 0.025 
per 100 economically active (2.60) GCSE total score (95.79) (6.81) pupil with other SEN (0.015) 
Median house price 161,025 2004 cohort age 988.95 Pakistani, (%) 2.38 No registered SEN 0.052 
(55,234) 11–16 value-added (27.48) (7.60) pupils (0.221) 
Owner-occupation rate, % 63.93 (Sample members with missing values 0.046 Bangladeshi, (%) 0.87 
(9.85) for school prior performance) (0.209) (4.95) 
Mean of Index of Multiple − 0.197 Average class size 22.03 Black Caribbean, (%) 1.69 
Deprivation (0.926) (2.07) (3.27) 
In Greater London 0.131 (Sample members with missing 0.101 Black African, (%) 1.34 
(0.337) values for class size) (0.301) (2.41) 
Observations: 14,994 14,994 14,994 14,994 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population probability weights and accounting for 
clustering at the school level. 
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Table A2 
Eﬀect of changes in local labour market conditions on subject choice and educational aspirations. 
Dependent variable: Child takes qualiﬁcation in a Child intends to stay in Full-time 
“Food Subject ” Education after age 16 
Male Female Male Female 
Age 14 Age 15 Age 14 Age 15 Age 14 Age 15 Age 14 Age 15 
Age 18–24 claimant − 0.331 − 0.689 − 0.140 − 0.275 0.844 0.596 0.011 − 0.282 
count unemp’ rate (0.575) (0.561) (0.815) (0.779) (0.647) (0.577) (0.457) (0.369) 
SIC G/H VAT-registered 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 − 0.006 ∗ ∗ 0.000 0.002 0.003 
businesses per 100 youths (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 5446 5446 5339 5339 4943 5025 4790 4967 
Notes: A “Food Subject ” is a GCSE in Food Technology or a National Vocational Qualiﬁcation in Leisure and Tourism, 
or Hospitality and Catering. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.1. Longitudinal 
weights applied. Additional covariates : As in ‘Full’ speciﬁcation (columns 5 and 10 of Table 5 ). Standard errors 
in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population probability 
weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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a  4. Non-employment responses to the instrumental variables 
If teenagers observe and respond to our instrumental variables in
ays other than their part-time working hours, this would invalidate our
nstruments. An example of this could be students becoming more likely
o take qualiﬁcations in subjects that would prepare them well to work
n the retail, wholesale, hotel or restaurant sectors, in Districts where
here is a higher density of businesses in these sectors. In Table A2 we
herefore ﬁrst present results showing the eﬀect of the instruments mea-
ured at ages 14 (when GCSE subjects must initially be made) and 15
allowing for changes in subject choices) on the probability that at age
5 the child is working towards a qualiﬁcation in a ‘Food subject’. By this
e mean a GCSE in Food Technology, or a National Vocational Qualiﬁ-
ation in Leisure and Tourism, or Hospitality and Catering. For neither
ales nor females does this decision respond signiﬁcantly or by a quan-
itatively large magnitude either to the youth unemployment rate, or
ore importantly to the density of VAT-registered small businesses in
he industries relevant to these subjects. 
Another threat to validity would be if schoollhildren with present-
iased preferences treat the presence of suitable labour market oppor-
unities as creating high opportunity costs of further education and low
eturn to higher grades. This may cause them to reduce their eﬀort, in
hich case our estimated eﬀect of in-school employment on school per-
ormance, study time and attitude to schoolwork would be negatively
iased. On the right-hand-side of Table A2 we therefore show the eﬀects
f the instruments at age 14 and 15 on the contemporaneous probabil-
ty that the child intends to leave full-time education at age 16. The
leanest test is with the coeﬃcients on the youth unemployment rate
t age 14, because as shown in Table 5 , the local youth unemployment
ate has zero eﬀect on employment opportunities at age 14. This means
e are not concerned that any response to this variable observed in
ducational aspirations is endogenous to accumulated part-time work
xperience. This enables us to test whether there is some anticipatory
ﬀect on educational aspirations that may inﬂuence educational perfor-
ance over the longer-run. However, we ﬁnd no eﬀect for either males
r females. 
We also ﬁnd no reduced form eﬀect for: the youth unemployment
ate at age 15, which although Table 5 shows is not signiﬁcant, will
e partially correlated with age 15 part-time work; for the SIC G/H
ensity at age 14 for girls (not signiﬁcant but will be partially corre-
ated with age 14 part-time work); or for the SIC G/H density at age
5, which we will show does positively inﬂuence selection into part-
ime work. One coeﬃcient here is signiﬁcant. Increasing the density
f SIC G/H businesses locally at age 14 reduces boys’ intention to re-
ain in full-time education after 16. This may directly result from se-
ection into part-time work caused by this instrument leading boys to
eel better prepared to leave school, but it could indicate that prospec-
ive school-leaving employment opportunities reduce motivation to per-orm well in education. Reassuringly, by age 15, this coeﬃcient becomes
 precisely estimated zero. In our ﬁnal speciﬁcation (columns 5 and
0 in Table 5 and all subsequent estimates) we include age 14 edu-
ational performance as a control variable. This absorbs the contem-
oraneous eﬀects of labour market opportunities on educational mo-
ivation, and we focus on the eﬀects of age 15 part-time work, the
nstruments for which this exercise has given no reason to doubt the
alidity. 
5. Measures of health 
Our main results show no signiﬁcant eﬀects on mental health at
ge 17, though at face-value, the magnitude of the detrimental esti-
ated eﬀect for males reduces somewhat when inputs during compul-
ory schooling are accounted for, with losses in Active Leisure and At-
itude to schoolwork being netted out (see coeﬃcients in Table A7 in
ppendix A.7 ). This stability of the coeﬃcients shows that although
isky behaviours are strongly detrimentally associated with mental
ealth for females, part-time work does not facilitate these risky be-
aviours to a suﬃcient extent, or for enough people, for this to ex-
lain any diﬀerences in mental health even at this short range. In
ables A3 and A4 below, we show the results of this exercise for the
hreshold measures of at least four items, and for self-reported ‘fairly
ood’ or ‘very good’ general health. The policy eﬀects are all statisti-
ally indistinguishable from zero, but the production function parame-
ers for ‘very good’ health become more positive when educational per-
ormance, and then other activities at age 15, are controlled for. This
upports there being a beneﬁcial eﬀect of part-time work at age 15, that
s suppressed in policy eﬀect estimations by consumption of risky sub-
tances and loss of Active Leisure opportunities. Table A5 shows that by
ge 25 there are small but signiﬁcant negative (i.e. detrimental) eﬀects
n all three thresholds for males, and positive but insigniﬁcant coeﬃ-
ients for females at the ‘good’ and ‘very good’ margins. 
6. Distribution of latent inputs 
Recall that the measurement model (reported in Table 2 ) was esti-
ated using the pooled sample of both waves and sexes. This ensures
hat a standard deviation change in each factor represents a common
nit in terms of absolute activity levels, the interpretations of which are
rovided in Table 3 . In turn, this means that the parameters represent-
ng the crowd-out or facilitation of each activity by employment, and
heir production function parameters, are directly comparable between
aves and sexes. 
Figs. A3 –A7 show the distribution of the principal component of
ach latent factor by wave and sex. Each histogram has 12 bins, and
he four histograms within each ﬁgure share a common scale on both
xes. The similarity or overlap between groups mean that the proposed
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Table A3 
Marginal eﬀects on probability of having at least four items (out of 12) of poor mental health at age 17. 
Male Female 
Policy eﬀect Add educational Add attitudes Policy eﬀect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.005 0.001 0.001 − 0.005 ∗ ∗ − 0.002 − 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.008 − 0.004 − 0.008 − 0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Attitude, age 15 0.002 0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Study, age 15 − 0.001 0.002 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Active Leisure, age 15 − 0.020 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 ∗ ∗ 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.003 − 0.007 ∗ 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 − 0.004 0.002 
(0.006) (0.005) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2651 2651 2651 3287 3287 3287 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
Table A4 
Marginal eﬀects on probability of having “fairly ” or “very good ” health at age 17. 
Panel A: ‘Fairly’ or ‘very’ good health at age 17 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.000 0.001 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.000 − 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.003 0.000 0.013 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Attitude, age 15 0.003 ∗ − 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Study, age 15 − 0.000 − 0.004 ∗ ∗ 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.000 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.000 − 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.000 − 0.006 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 5059 5059 5059 5003 5003 5003 
Panel B: ‘Very’ good health at age 17 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.005 ∗ 0.006 ∗ 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.029 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.007 0.028 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Attitude, age 15 0.018 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Study, age 15 − 0.002 − 0.012 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.007 ∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Social Life, age 15 0.002 − 0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 − 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 5059 5059 5059 5003 5003 5003 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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Table A5 
Policy eﬀects: Marginal eﬀects on probability of general health surpassing self-reported thresholds at age 17 and age 25. 
Age 17 Age 25 
‘Fairly good’ or better ‘Very good’ ‘Good’ or better ‘Very good’ or better ‘Excellent’ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Age 15 part-time working 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.002 0.000 − 0.011 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 − 0.006 ∗ 0.004 − 0.006 ∗ ∗ − 0.001 
hours per week (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
(Estimated pop’ mean) 0.938 0.901 0.541 0.442 0.867 0.870 0.615 0.603 0.248 0.200 
Observations 5059 5003 5059 5003 2692 3335 2692 3335 2692 3335 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population probability 
weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. Age 17 elicited on four-point scale, top two categories used as thresholds; Age 25 
elicited on ﬁve-point scale, top three categories used as thresholds. 
Table A6 
Production functions estimates for age 25 earnings and hours. 
Panel A: Weekly take home earnings at age 25, £
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.333 3.060 3.661 − 3.450 − 7.262 − 6.024 
(6.025) (4.815) (4.525) (3.874) (4.458) (4.395) 
GCSE total points, z -score 64.359 ∗ ∗ ∗ 57.635 ∗ ∗ ∗ 59.955 ∗ ∗ ∗ 57.413 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(11.817) (11.144) (9.167) (9.297) 
Attitude, age 15 − 5.556 16.334 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(7.726) (5.519) 
Study, age 15 1.047 2.733 
(6.548) (5.207) 
Active Leisure, age 15 11.666 14.953 ∗ ∗ 
(8.413) (7.055) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 17.714 ∗ ∗ − 1.464 
(8.597) (5.538) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2678 2678 2678 3345 3345 3345 
Panel B: Hourly wages for those in work at age 25, £
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.269 ∗ 0.205 0.196 − 0.101 0.680 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.687 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.151) (0.142) (0.145) (0.090) (0.167) (0.159) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.398 0.382 0.913 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.900 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.252) (0.250) (0.225) (0.228) 
Attitude, age 15 − 0.090 0.343 ∗ ∗ 
(0.182) (0.162) 
Study, age 15 0.110 − 0.081 
(0.142) (0.143) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.000 0.355 ∗ ∗ 
(0.174) (0.142) 
Social Life, age 15 0.023 0.083 
(0.120) (0.100) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.463 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.127 
(0.165) (0.141) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2203 2203 2203 2569 2569 2569 
Panel C: Weekly hours of work at age 25, £
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.114 0.600 0.589 − 0.209 − 0.520 − 0.421 
(0.824) (0.568) (0.579) (0.368) (0.538) (0.516) 
GCSE total points, z -score 4.767 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.902 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.859 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.213 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.104) (1.079) (1.002) (1.021) 
Attitude, age 15 − 0.424 1.206 ∗ 
(0.735) (0.653) 
Study, age 15 0.618 0.399 
(0.631) (0.590) 
Active Leisure, age 15 2.160 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.682 
(0.767) (0.685) 
Social Life, age 15 0.853 0.053 
(0.649) (0.602) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.054 − 0.724 
(0.838) (0.635) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2726 2726 2726 3362 3362 3362 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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Production function estimates for health at ages 17 and 25. 
Panel A: General Health Questionnaire: Items of poor health (out of 12) at age
Male 
Policy effect Add educational A
performance an
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.083 0.067 0.
(0.249) (0.186) (0
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.166 ∗ 0.
(0.086) (0
Attitude, age 15 −
(0
Study, age 15 −
(0
Active Leisure, age 15 −
(0
Social Life, age 15 −
(0
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.
(0
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 54
N (second stage) 4891 4891 48
Panel B: General Health Questionnaire: Items of poor health (out of 12)
Male 
Policy effect Add educational A
performance an
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.148 0.001 −
(0.138) (0.146) (0
GCSE total points, z -score − 0.227 −
(0.173) (0
Attitude, age 15 −
(0
Study, age 15 −
(0
Active Leisure, age 15 −
(0
Social Life, age 15 −
(0
Risky Behaviours, age 15 −
(0
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 54
N (second stage) 2651 2651 26
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is r
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. isky behaviours are highly postively skewed, though in a verysimilar
ay for boys and girls. For all groups the modal density is at no risky
ehaviours. 
7. Complete estimation output 
Tables A6 –A13 show coeﬃcients and standard errors on covariates
mitted from Tables in the main text for reasons of space.  17 
Female 
dd attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
d activities performance and activities 
008 0.040 0.033 0.022 
.085) (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) 
058 − 0.390 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.198 ∗ 
.085) (0.106) (0.107) 
 0.149 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.045 
.053) (0.075) 
 0.011 0.105 
.053) (0.079) 
 0.128 ∗ ∗ − 0.088 
.057) (0.076) 
 0.091 ∗ 0.023 
.051) (0.062) 
080 0.446 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
.065) (0.077) 
46 5339 5339 5339 
91 4784 4784 4784 
 at age 25 
Female 
dd attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
d activities performance and activities 
 0.018 − 0.116 ∗ ∗ − 0.077 − 0.076 
.107) (0.051) (0.065) (0.061) 
 0.108 − 0.376 ∗ ∗ − 0.262 
.170) (0.163) (0.172) 
 0.020 0.025 
.105) (0.101) 
 0.043 0.079 
.089) (0.088) 
 0.460 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.229 ∗ ∗ 
.122) (0.113) 
 0.137 − 0.062 
.093) (0.083) 
 0.011 0.091 
.124) (0.104) 
46 5339 5339 5339 
51 3287 3287 3287 
aw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
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Table A8 
Production function estimates for unemployment experience and occupational attainment at age 25. 
Panel A: Total duration of unemployment (months) September 2006–August 2015 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 2.000 ∗ ∗ − 1.519 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.536 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.425 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.174 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.197 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.781) (0.315) (0.308) (0.383) (0.293) (0.272) 
GCSE total points, z -score − 3.311 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 3.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.777 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.840 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.817) (0.871) (1.480) (1.397) 
Attitude, age 15 − 0.636 0.301 
(0.636) (0.529) 
Study, age 15 0.090 − 0.906 
(0.567) (0.624) 
Active Leisure, age 15 − 0.416 0.108 
(0.723) (0.582) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.695 0.520 
(0.532) (0.481) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.037 0.062 
(0.744) (0.550) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2715 2715 2715 3397 3397 3397 
Panel B: In a Managerial or Professional Occupation at age 25 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.019 ∗ ∗ − 0.001 − 0.000 0.011 0.016 ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.092 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.074 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
Attitude, age 15 0.027 ∗ 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.010) 
Study, age 15 0.011 0.002 
(0.011) (0.010) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.006 0.017 
(0.013) (0.011) 
Social Life, age 15 0.003 0.008 
(0.011) (0.010) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.004 − 0.016 
(0.012) (0.011) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2704 2704 2704 3296 3296 3296 
Panel C: Small Employer or Own Account Worker at age 25 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.010 ∗ ∗ 0.010 ∗ ∗ 0.008 ∗ 0.003 − 0.001 − 0.001 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.005 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Attitude, age 15 − 0.016 ∗ − 0.011 ∗ ∗ 
(0.008) (0.005) 
Study, age 15 0.004 0.000 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.012 0.002 
(0.008) (0.005) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.001 0.006 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 0.013 ∗ − 0.003 
(0.008) (0.005) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 2704 2704 2704 3296 3296 3296 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
A. Holford Labour Economics 63 (2020) 101806 
Table A9 
Production functions estimates for educational retention and earnings for early labour market entrants. 
Panel A: In full-time education or training at age 17 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.014 ∗ ∗ − 0.012 ∗ ∗ 0.008 0.011 0.011 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.153 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.135 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.108 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Attitude, age 15 0.007 0.019 ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.008) 
Study, age 15 0.008 − 0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Active Leisure, age 15 − 0.002 0.016 ∗ 
(0.010) (0.009) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.020 ∗ ∗ − 0.003 
(0.009) (0.007) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 − 0.019 ∗ − 0.026 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.008) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 5197 5197 5197 5088 5088 5088 
Panel B: Weekly Earnings, £s, conditional on not being in Full-time Education, at age 17 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 0.629 0.603 0.233 3.582 ∗ ∗ 3.643 ∗ ∗ 3.400 ∗ ∗ 
(1.602) (1.593) (1.602) (1.574) (1.542) (1.586) 
GCSE total points, z -score 4.089 5.204 10.595 ∗ 4.427 
(5.254) (5.479) (5.771) (6.429) 
Attitude, age 15 − 10.639 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.784 
(3.695) (3.648) 
Study, age 15 1.704 8.927 
(3.502) (6.882) 
Active Leisure, age 15 3.960 9.435 ∗ ∗ 
(4.141) (4.154) 
Social Life, age 15 5.090 1.599 
(3.466) (4.285) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 − 0.564 − 7.874 
(3.888) (5.979) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 1031 1031 1031 755 755 755 
Panel C: In Higher Education at age 19 
Male Female 
Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes Policy effect Add educational Add attitudes 
performance and activities performance and activities 
Hours paid work p.wk, age 15 − 0.004 − 0.003 0.000 0.009 ∗ 0.009 0.010 ∗ 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
GCSE total points, z -score 0.130 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.118 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Attitude, age 15 0.019 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Study, age 15 − 0.011 0.007 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Active Leisure, age 15 0.012 ∗ 0.015 ∗ 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Social Life, age 15 − 0.010 − 0.017 ∗ ∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Risky Behaviours, age 15 − 0.029 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 
(0.008) (0.010) 
N (ﬁrst stage) 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
N (second stage) 4268 4268 4268 4408 4408 4408 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Observations shown is raw sample size, but estimates obtained using age-14 population 
probability weights and accounting for clustering at the school level. 
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Table A10 
Coeﬃents on all non-instrument or instrumented covariates: “Full ” policy eﬀect speciﬁcation for eﬀect of part-time work on age 16 
educational performance (page 1 of 4). 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work hours Work hours GCSE Work hours Work hours GCSE 
Age 14 Age 15 z -score Age 14 Age 15 z -score 
(IV) (IV) 
Age 14 KS3 performance ( z -score) − 0.053 0.675 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.819 ∗ ∗ 0.620 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.425) (0.028) (0.330) (0.030) 
Age 11 KS2 performance ( z -score) 0.045 − 0.278 0.032 0.437 ∗ ∗ 1.494 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.081 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.179) (0.411) (0.025) (0.198) (0.343) (0.028) 
Age 14 KS3 performance missing − 0.125 − 0.555 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.362 − 0.348 ∗ 
(1.833) (0.153) (1.758) (0.184) 
Age 11 KS2 performance missing − 2.181 ∗ ∗ − 1.445 0.043 − 3.672 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.295 0.092 
(0.891) (1.051) (0.061) (1.266) (1.040) (0.073) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation − 0.757 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.695 ∗ ∗ − 0.038 ∗ ∗ − 0.539 ∗ ∗ − 0.219 − 0.011 
(0.235) (0.303) (0.017) (0.266) (0.278) (0.018) 
Permanent income percentile − 0.262 − 2.277 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.021 0.178 − 0.838 0.110 ∗ ∗ 
(0.722) (0.803) (0.047) (0.769) (0.794) (0.052) 
Month of birth within academic year − 0.052 − 0.017 0.006 − 0.163 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.123 ∗ ∗ 0.004 
(0.048) (0.054) (0.004) (0.056) (0.050) (0.004) 
Parent receives disability beneﬁt − 1.216 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.974 ∗ − 0.012 − 0.078 − 1.431 ∗ ∗ − 0.063 ∗ 
(0.467) (0.544) (0.032) (0.591) (0.591) (0.035) 
Parents own home (outright/mortgage) 0.217 0.443 0.081 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.918 ∗ ∗ 0.201 0.147 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.411) (0.461) (0.026) (0.437) (0.480) (0.031) 
Parent in part-time work 0.377 0.634 0.089 ∗ ∗ 0.127 0.813 0.172 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.684) (0.837) (0.041) (0.766) (0.789) (0.048) 
Parent in full-time work − 0.088 1.500 ∗ 0.068 ∗ 0.314 0.638 0.061 
(0.644) (0.783) (0.040) (0.712) (0.747) (0.045) 
Parents’ highest qualiﬁcations 
(omitted = no qualiﬁcations): 
Degree − 0.048 − 1.015 0.076 ∗ − 0.082 1.531 ∗ ∗ 0.104 ∗ ∗ 
(0.649) (0.823) (0.044) (0.781) (0.755) (0.048) 
A-Levels 0.455 0.257 0.046 − 0.240 2.094 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.087 ∗ 
(0.547) (0.719) (0.040) (0.678) (0.701) (0.045) 
GCSEs 0.526 0.465 0.034 0.450 2.183 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.058 
(0.538) (0.689) (0.037) (0.650) (0.680) (0.043) 
Other 1.636 2.352 ∗ − 0.025 − 0.024 0.691 0.061 
(1.205) (1.305) (0.073) (1.440) (1.553) (0.079) 
Non-resident siblings − 0.048 − 0.037 − 0.021 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.101 0.056 − 0.050 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.123) (0.140) (0.008) (0.142) (0.140) (0.011) 
Co-resident siblings 0.549 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.596 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.009 0.593 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.714 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.127) (0.151) (0.009) (0.153) (0.166) (0.011) 
Lone parent − 0.642 ∗ 0.117 − 0.184 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.235 − 0.507 − 0.151 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.364) (0.492) (0.028) (0.396) (0.426) (0.028) 
Parental occupation: 
(omitted = Supervisory/Technical/Semi-routine) 
Self-employed 0.112 0.908 0.018 0.746 0.634 − 0.046 
(0.475) (0.564) (0.034) (0.524) (0.567) (0.042) 
Managerial/professional − 0.726 ∗ 0.249 0.064 ∗ ∗ − 0.465 − 0.182 0.018 
(0.377) (0.414) (0.025) (0.387) (0.392) (0.025) 
Intermediate − 1.448 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.822 0.069 ∗ − 1.155 ∗ − 0.102 0.010 
(0.535) (0.659) (0.040) (0.595) (0.625) (0.039) 
Long-term unemployed − 0.270 − 1.018 0.018 − 1.630 ∗ ∗ − 0.277 0.003 
(0.676) (0.874) (0.044) (0.781) (0.895) (0.052) 
Continued on next page 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but population 
means and standard deviations are estimated using probability weights. 
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Table A11 
Coeﬃents on all non-instrument or instrumented covariates: “Full ” policy eﬀect speciﬁcation for eﬀect of part-time work on 
age 16 educational performance (page 2 of 4). 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work hours Work hours GCSE Work hours Work hours GCSE 
Age 14 Age 15 z -score Age 14 Age 15 z -score 
(IV) (IV) 
Continued from previous page 
Ethnicity: (omitted = White) 
Mixed − 3.122 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.932 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.150 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.436 − 0.655 0.087 ∗ 
(0.810) (1.048) (0.052) (0.816) (0.826) (0.052) 
Indian − 3.366 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.273 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.280 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 5.102 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.170 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.277 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.755) (0.988) (0.048) (1.230) (1.205) (0.048) 
Pakistani − 6.896 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 6.206 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.274 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 8.448 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 9.358 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.304 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.088) (1.199) (0.062) (2.056) (2.212) (0.061) 
Bangladeshi − 6.665 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.795 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.300 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 8.035 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 8.278 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.295 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.890) (1.473) (0.082) (2.413) (2.478) (0.103) 
Black Caribbean − 1.462 − 2.964 ∗ 0.211 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.896 − 1.578 0.208 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.588) (1.555) (0.066) (1.126) (1.164) (0.068) 
Black African − 3.289 ∗ ∗ − 3.379 ∗ ∗ 0.265 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.426 − 2.933 ∗ ∗ 0.382 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.336) (1.601) (0.087) (1.310) (1.473) (0.064) 
Other − 1.608 − 3.069 ∗ ∗ 0.244 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.593 ∗ − 2.885 0.442 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(1.202) (1.324) (0.074) (1.354) (1.794) (0.076) 
Has Special Educational − 0.047 − 0.501 − 0.273 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.294 − 0.290 − 0.252 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Needs (SEN) (0.387) (0.487) (0.033) (0.610) (0.648) (0.046) 
SEN missing − 3.839 − 3.056 ∗ − 0.362 − 3.393 ∗ − 5.980 ∗ − 0.596 ∗ ∗ 
(3.211) (1.736) (0.240) (1.927) (3.085) (0.249) 
Geography: Omitted = Urban areas 
Town/village ( < 10,000 inhabitants) − 0.422 0.623 − 0.021 0.933 ∗ ∗ 1.843 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.034 
(0.378) (0.445) (0.030) (0.423) (0.426) (0.033) 
Isolated settlement 0.297 1.192 − 0.022 0.547 2.749 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.081 
(0.701) (0.873) (0.049) (0.835) (0.724) (0.058) 
Not Greater London 0.468 − 0.799 − 0.070 1.296 0.919 − 0.040 
(0.852) (1.017) (0.061) (1.046) (1.082) (0.073) 
Timing of interview, wave 1: 
February − 1.227 0.033 − 1.396 ∗ − 0.017 
(0.750) (0.070) (0.849) (0.066) 
March − 0.856 0.004 − 0.566 − 0.015 
(0.763) (0.067) (0.842) (0.067) 
April − 0.731 − 0.034 − 0.745 − 0.007 
(0.763) (0.066) (0.839) (0.070) 
May − 0.365 0.054 − 0.132 − 0.050 
(0.787) (0.070) (0.827) (0.072) 
June 0.129 − 0.151 ∗ − 0.242 − 0.088 
(0.933) (0.082) (1.150) (0.074) 
After birthday 0.387 0.043 − 0.104 0.047 
(0.410) (0.035) (0.465) (0.036) 
Timing of interview, wave 2: 
February − 0.071 0.006 − 2.137 0.063 
(1.180) (0.073) (1.469) (0.083) 
March − 0.292 − 0.049 − 1.032 − 0.021 
(1.006) (0.054) (1.310) (0.071) 
April − 0.078 − 0.010 − 0.341 0.038 
(0.996) (0.050) (1.287) (0.070) 
May − 0.341 0.000 − 0.515 0.031 
(1.004) (0.052) (1.283) (0.072) 
June 0.365 0.014 − 0.591 0.047 
(1.059) (0.053) (1.301) (0.072) 
After birthday 0.504 − 0.035 − 0.593 − 0.044 
(0.529) (0.033) (0.460) (0.036) 
Continued on next page 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but 
population means and standard deviations are estimated using probability weights. 
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Table A12 
Coeﬃents on all non-instrument or instrumented covariates: “Full ” policy eﬀect speciﬁcation for eﬀect of part-time work on 
age 16 educational performance (page 3 of 4). 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work hours Work hours GCSE Work hours Work hours GCSE 
Age 14 Age 15 z -score Age 14 Age 15 z -score 
(IV) (IV) 
Continued from previous page 
Local Authority controls: 
Disability recipients aged 35–59 0.201 − 0.071 0.015 − 0.102 − 0.273 ∗ ∗ − 0.012 
(0.149) (0.180) (0.012) (0.162) (0.136) (0.014) 
Full-time jobs per 100 working age pop’ − 0.006 − 0.076 ∗ ∗ 0.001 − 0.051 ∗ − 0.031 0.002 
(0.027) (0.034) (0.002) (0.030) (0.028) (0.002) 
Part-time jobs per 100 working age pop’ 0.112 0.254 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.001 0.103 0.070 − 0.002 
(0.069) (0.086) (0.006) (0.077) (0.072) (0.007) 
Self-employed per 100 econ-active 0.016 − 0.247 − 0.006 0.025 − 0.011 0.001 
(0.126) (0.178) (0.009) (0.131) (0.140) (0.009) 
Median house price − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.000 0.001 − 0.010 − 0.001 ∗ 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.001) 
Owner-occupation rate 0.047 0.052 0.005 ∗ 0.003 − 0.006 − 0.003 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.003) (0.030) (0.033) (0.003) 
School controls: 
Single sex − 0.782 − 0.662 0.062 − 0.435 − 0.627 − 0.174 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.539) (0.736) (0.055) (0.810) (0.689) (0.047) 
Selective 0.170 − 0.170 − 0.290 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.674 − 0.354 − 0.114 
(0.993) (1.320) (0.094) (1.549) (1.823) (0.146) 
Independent 5.076 9.185 ∗ ∗ 0.405 15.293 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.003 ∗ ∗ − 0.123 
(3.863) (3.644) (0.561) (3.735) (4.146) (0.424) 
Faith − 0.076 − 0.150 0.008 0.529 − 0.221 − 0.062 
(0.381) (0.488) (0.038) (0.473) (0.475) (0.041) 
Has sixth form − 0.306 0.392 0.014 − 0.635 0.025 0.025 
(0.373) (0.507) (0.036) (0.461) (0.450) (0.034) 
2004 cohort GCSE point 0.000 0.002 0.003 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.012 ∗ ∗ − 0.009 ∗ 0.003 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
score (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
2004 cohort value-added − 0.009 − 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.005 − 0.001 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013) (0.001) 
2004 cohort value-added − 9.009 − 13.077 0.442 10.658 0.668 − 0.550 
missing (8.688) (11.533) (0.953) (11.379) (12.437) (0.934) 
Average class size 0.040 0.059 − 0.001 0.050 0.110 − 0.001 
(0.082) (0.113) (0.008) (0.104) (0.100) (0.008) 
Average class size − 5.549 ∗ ∗ − 4.414 − 0.410 ∗ − 0.903 2.745 0.286 
missing (2.369) (3.270) (0.214) (2.818) (3.241) (0.214) 
Pupils with SEN statements 0.138 0.012 − 0.006 − 0.036 − 0.041 − 0.006 
(%) (0.110) (0.144) (0.009) (0.130) (0.141) (0.010) 
SEN pupils without − 0.043 − 0.026 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.039 − 0.014 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
statements (%) (0.026) (0.031) (0.002) (0.029) (0.030) (0.002) 
SEN statistics missing 3.872 ∗ 0.893 0.994 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 5.172 ∗ ∗ − 4.915 0.251 
(2.217) (3.070) (0.226) (2.537) (3.372) (0.191) 
Free school meal − 0.021 − 0.015 0.009 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.067 ∗ ∗ − 0.080 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.007 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
entitlement, % (0.025) (0.030) (0.002) (0.029) (0.030) (0.002) 
English as a foreign − 0.051 0.061 0.003 0.038 0.040 0.002 
language, % (0.053) (0.059) (0.003) (0.054) (0.053) (0.003) 
Continued on next page 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, but 
population means and standard deviations are estimated using probability weights. 
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Table A13 
Coeﬃents on all non-instrument or instrumented covariates: “Full ” policy eﬀect speciﬁcation for eﬀect of part-time work 
on age 16 educational performance (page 4 of 4). 
Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work hours Work hours GCSE Work hours Work hours GCSE 
Age 14 Age 15 z -score Age 14 Age 15 z -score 
(IV) (IV) 
Continued from previous page 
School ethnicity composition, (%): 
Indian 0.039 − 0.081 − 0.004 − 0.087 − 0.084 − 0.005 
(0.054) (0.064) (0.004) (0.064) (0.062) (0.003) 
Pakistani 0.074 − 0.060 − 0.010 ∗ ∗ − 0.046 − 0.067 − 0.005 
(0.057) (0.066) (0.004) (0.062) (0.063) (0.004) 
Bangladeshi 0.118 ∗ − 0.058 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.059 − 0.002 
(0.065) (0.090) (0.004) (0.067) (0.076) (0.004) 
Black Carribbean 0.090 0.237 − 0.002 0.036 − 0.011 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.110) (0.177) (0.009) (0.102) (0.104) (0.005) 
Black African − 0.080 − 0.236 0.004 − 0.214 ∗ − 0.107 − 0.016 ∗ ∗ 
(0.143) (0.144) (0.009) (0.115) (0.118) (0.006) 
Mixed 0.208 ∗ 0.059 − 0.009 0.032 0.229 ∗ − 0.015 ∗ 
(0.107) (0.124) (0.009) (0.105) (0.125) (0.009) 
Other − 0.007 − 0.027 0.001 − 0.024 − 0.024 0.002 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.002) (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) 
Teaching resourcing: 
Qualiﬁed teachers − 2.531 − 10.660 − 1.370 − 21.399 − 1.283 1.817 
per pupil (11.574) (11.899) (1.257) (17.230) (22.063) (2.051) 
Other teachers per 44.699 4.015 − 0.832 29.661 − 72.295 ∗ − 3.971 
pupil (33.407) (43.070) (3.154) (48.583) (40.920) (3.241) 
Teaching Assistants 19.919 29.774 − 4.248 − 247.607 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 25.210 − 4.354 
per pupil (79.835) (102.543) (7.253) (86.731) (83.133) (6.713) 
Support staff per pupil − 6.789 − 56.331 8.337 178.797 ∗ ∗ 45.064 6.537 
(64.489) (76.416) (5.125) (70.101) (68.029) (5.462) 
SEN support staff per 3.029 ∗ 1.314 − 0.281 ∗ ∗ 0.972 − 0.246 − 0.009 
SEN-statement pupil (1.823) (2.139) (0.142) (1.582) (1.358) (0.127) 
SEN support staff per − 2.645 20.854 3.719 ∗ ∗ ∗ 14.456 3.000 0.771 
SEN pupil with no statement (14.250) (17.941) (1.394) (15.637) (14.395) (1.203) 
No SEN pupils 0.990 3.614 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.010 0.500 0.973 0.047 
(0.934) (1.197) (0.123) (1.533) (1.569) (0.171) 
Observations 5446 5446 5446 5339 5339 5339 
Notes: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations shown is raw sample size, 
but population means and standard deviations are estimated using probability weights. 
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